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ABSTRACT 
The rise in globalization, coupled with the use of technology to accelerate approval, and 
payable cycles, the increase of outsourcing of goods and services, and the pressure to cut 
costs, have resulted in government organizations being more exposed to the risk of fraud 
in their procurement process.  Hence, appropriate internal controls and fraud prevention 
strategies are necessary for deterring, detecting, and managing procurement fraud. 
The purpose of this research was to develop a guideline to help government 
organizations design an effective system of internal controls to deter fraud in public 
procurement processes and practices.  This was done through a review, analysis, and 
discussion of 20 case studies of actual fraud incidents.  In each case study, internal 
control weaknesses were identified and analyzed in terms of the fundamental principles 
that are associated with the five internal control components.  The analysis revealed that 
the majority of the organizations in the case studies lacked three internal control 
components, namely control environment, control activities, and monitoring activities.  
Recommendations for improvements for each case study were presented by applying 
relevant internal controls into its procurement process to deter procurement fraud.  The 
areas for further research were also provided. 
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Perhaps, the first recorded instance of fraud occurred in 300 B.C., when a Greek 
merchant named Hegestratos took up a loan known as bottomry and agreed to pay it back 
with interest when he received his goods.  The moneylender could confiscate 
Hegestratos’ boat and goods if he failed to pay back the loan.  Hegestratos’ plan was to 
sink his empty boat, pocket the loan, and sell the goods.  The plan did not work out since 
he drowned while trying to escape from his crew when they caught him in the act 
(Beattie, 2009). 
The origin of fraud is traced as far back as 300 B.C.  However, it was the rise in 
globalization in the last decade that drove companies to grow in international markets and 
that took fraud to its height.  As correctly predicted in the first edition of the Fraud 
Examiners’ Manual in 1989, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
claimed that “fraud will be the crime of choice for the 21st century” (ACFE, 2013, p. 1).  
The rise in globalization, coupled with the use of technology to accelerate approval and 
payable cycles, the increase of outsourcing of goods and services and the pressure to cut 
costs, have resulted in government organizations being more exposed to the risk of fraud 
in their procurement process.  Hence, appropriate internal controls and fraud prevention 
strategies are necessary for deterring, detecting, and managing procurement fraud. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to develop a guideline to help government 
organizations design an effective system of internal controls to deter fraud in public 
procurement processes and practices. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
According to the 2012 Global Fraud Study conducted by ACFE, of the 1,388 
cases of occupational fraud reported by the certified fraud examiners who investigated 
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them, purchasing is one of the six areas where the majority of fraudulent activities were 
committed (ACFE, 2012).  This trend was similar to the findings in ACFE’s 2010 study.  
Procurement fraud is pervasive, and organizations are vulnerable to fraud in their 
procurement process.  Government organizations are generally more susceptible to fraud 
due to the complex nature of purchases and the enormous amount of funds involved.  The 
ACFE study (2012) found that government and public administration is one of the 
industries most commonly victimized by fraud.  Moreover, as the amount of public funds 
being channeled into the market through public procurement procedures increases, the 
procurement process continues to be highly vulnerable to fraudulent activities 
(Organisation For Economic Co-operation Development (OECD), 2013).  According to 
the OECD, government procurement constitutes about 15% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and 80% of world merchandise and commercial services exports in 1998 
(OECD, 2005).  Data has also shown that governments in the Asia-Pacific region 
generally pay about 20% to 100% more for public goods and services due to procurement 
fraud (Asian Development Bank (ASB) & OECD, 2007).  This means that government 
organizations have less money to fund public services such as education, health, and 
public transportation needed to reduce poverty and improve their citizens’ quality of life 
(ASB & OECD, 2007). 
In addition, procurement fraud damages the government organizations’ 
reputation, causes financial loss, and undermines the public’s confidence in the 
governmental structure and management.  While the risk of fraud cannot be eliminated 
entirely, it can be greatly reduced with an appropriate procurement fraud prevention 
strategy.  Hence, in recent years, worldwide efforts have been channeled into fighting 
corruption and promoting integrity in public procurement.  For example, among other 
things, in an effort to combat corruption, Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
requires that Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer certify on a quarterly 
basis that they have internal controls and have evaluated the effectiveness of these 
internal controls within the previous 90 days (SOX-Online, 2012).  In addition, Section 
406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that all publicly held companies establish 
a code of ethical conduct and business ethics for their directors and employees (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2003). 
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The proper application and enforcement of internal controls in the procurement 
process can help to deter fraudulent activities within government organizations.  By 
analyzing the internal control components and how they can be used to deter procurement 
fraud through a detailed analysis of case studies of procurement fraud incidents, this 
research project aims to answer the following questions: 
1. How are internal controls and procurement processes integrated? 
2. What factors contribute to public procurement fraud incidents? 
3. How can internal controls within the procurement processes deter public 
procurement fraud? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This research consists of a detailed review of recent literature regarding internal 
controls and the procurement process and recent procurement fraud case analysis.  The 
literature review includes a discussion of the public procurement process, the internal 
control components and the types of procurement fraud.  The literature review will also 
discuss how internal controls can be integrated into the public procurement process to 
deter fraudulent activities.  The procurement fraud case studies will be drawn mainly 
from the Encyclopedia of Ethical Failure (updated as of July 2013) (Department of 
Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013) compiled by the Standards of Conduct Office 
of the Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, Early Bird Current News, and 
other news articles.  The literature review will be followed by a review and analysis of 
procurement fraud cases to identify weaknesses in internal controls or lack of internal 
controls within the procurement process.  Finally, this research will conclude with 
recommendations for improvements in the procurement process to deter procurement 
fraud and areas for further research.  These recommendations serve to provide guidelines 
for other government organizations to develop and design an effective system of internal 
controls to deter fraud. 
E. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research will analyze and discuss how internal controls and procurement 
processes are integrated.  One benefit of this analysis will shed light on the extent of 
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integration of internal control components in the public procurement process.  Another 
benefit of this research is to identify the factors that contribute to public procurement 
fraud incidents through detailed analysis of case studies of procurement fraud incidents.  
The result will provide insight on the areas of weaknesses in internal control or lack of 
internal controls in public procurement.  A final benefit of this research is to analyze how 
internal controls can be integrated within the procurement processes to deter public 
procurement fraud.  This analysis will emphasize and highlight the importance of the 
integration of internal controls into the procurement process to deter procurement fraud. 
As this research focuses primarily on literature reviews which are limited to 
collecting and analyzing past information across various government organizations, the 
research findings will be limited in context.  Moreover, the research findings are 
generalized to all government procurement fraud. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This thesis is composed of five chapters including this introduction chapter.  
Chapter II consists of a literature review of the procurement process, internal control 
components, types of procurement fraud and the integration of internal controls in the 
procurement process.  The literature review in Chapter II focuses on building the basic 
foundation of the research.  Building on this foundation, Chapter III examines case 
studies of procurement fraud incidents and identifies internal control weaknesses or lack 
of internal controls in these cases.  Chapter IV provides recommendations for 
improvement by discussing the relevant internal controls in the procurement process to 
deter procurement fraud so as to provide guidelines for other government organizations to 
be able to develop and design an effective internal control system to deter fraud.  Chapter 
V consists of a summary, conclusion and areas for further research. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an introduction and overview of the research.  The extent of 
government organizations’ exposure to procurement fraud was reviewed, which 
emphasized the need to put in place effective internal controls within the procurement 
process to deter procurement fraud.  Government organizations are more exposed to 
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fraud due to the rise in globalization, the increased use of technology in the procurement 
process, proliferation of outsourcing of goods and services and pressure to cut costs.  
Public procurement is also most vulnerable to fraud considering the complexity of 
purchases and the enormous size of its financial flows to the market. As stated by 
Cendrowski, Martin, & Petro (2006) in The Handbook of Fraud Deterrence, the removal 
of opportunity (which is one of the three elements in the fraud triangle), that focuses on 
augmenting the system of internal controls, is probably the most effective tool to fraud 
deterrence.  Therefore, it is essential that proper application and enforcement of internal 
controls be employed in the procurement process to help deter fraudulent acts within 
government organizations.   
The objective of this research, which is to provide a guideline for government 
organizations to develop and design an effective system of internal controls to deter fraud 
in the public procurement process, was presented.  This was followed by the framing of 
the three research questions, the benefits, and the limitations of the research.  Lastly, the 
methodology of the research was summarized.  The following chapter lays the foundation 
of this research by reviewing the literature on public procurement processes, internal 
control components, types of procurement fraud and the application of internal control 
components in the procurement process to deter procurement fraud.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, a literature review of the public procurement processes, internal 
control components and the different types of procurement fraud are presented.  In 
addition, a discussion on the integration of internal control components in the 
procurement process is presented.  This review builds the basic foundation of knowledge 
for this research and sets the stage for the subsequent chapters.  The public procurement 
process is discussed in the following section. 
B. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
A main difference between public procurement and private sector procurement is 
that public procurement is subject to more stringent legislative regulations and controls.  
The main reasons for the stringent regulations and controls are to ensure that the 
taxpayers’ money is spent effectively and economically, that contracts are awarded to 
suppliers on a fair, transparent and value-for-money basis, and that any fraudulent acts by 
the buyers and/or suppliers are prevented.  For example, the U.S. federal government 
procurement is governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (FAR, 2013), 
while the government procurement process in the United Kingdom (UK) is governed by 
the European Union Procurement Directives and the UK Procurement Regulations (UK 
Cabinet Office, 2013).  Often, public procurement officers are also governed by a set of 
stricter rules and regulations as a high standard of discipline and conduct is expected of 
these public officers.  Generally, private sector procurement officers are not subject to 
any legislative requirements to conduct a competitive procurement process.  Private 
sector procurement is governed by its organization’s procurement guidelines, which are 
formulated to meet the organization’s objectives.  However, if the organization’s 
procurement guidelines mandate the use of a competitive procurement process, the 
principles of fairness, transparency and value-for-money will apply as in the public sector 
(National Education Consulting Inc (NECI), 2013). 
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The public procurement process can be categorized into six phases, namely 
procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract 
administration and contract closeout (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  Together, these phases 
provide direction for the government organizations to purchase public goods and services 
in the most effective and economical manner based on the principles of fairness, 
transparency and value of money.  In addition, these processes assist the government 
organizations in their planning and executing of procurement strategy.  These processes 
ensure that the organizations’ purchases stay within the allocated budget throughout the 
product lifecycle and meet the user’s requirements and that the contractor performs in 
accordance with the contract (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The following section discusses 
each of these phases and their associated activities. 
1. Procurement Planning 
The procurement process starts with the procurement planning phase, which 
involves recognizing and identifying the organization’s needs and determining the user’s 
specific requirements, the mode of purchase, the quantity to purchase and the period of 
purchase so as to meet the organization’s specific needs (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The 
main activities of the procurement planning phase include determining and defining the 
procurement requirement, conducting market research, developing requirement 
documents (such as specifications, statement of work (SOW), or statement of objectives 
(SOO)), developing preliminary budgets and cost estimates, and considering initial 
contract types, risk assessment and special terms and conditions (Rendon, 2007).  These 
activities, which play a significant role in determining the contracting strategy of the 
purchase, have to be duly documented for subsequent review and approval (Rendon & 
Snider, 2008). 
a. Determining and Defining the Procurement Requirement 
The activity of determining and defining the requirement initiates the 
procurement process.  In this activity, the organization first identifies its need in terms of 
functions to be performed, performance and technical characteristics.  Next, it defines the 
needs or requirements by considering the following questions (Rendon, 2007): 
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• Do the requirements encourage bidders to supply commercial 
items or non-development items (if commercial items are not 
available)? 
• Can the requirements be altered appropriately such that they can be 
met by commercial items or non-development items? 
• Do the organizations want to make the goods or perform the 
services themselves in-house or buy the goods or services from an 
outside supplier or adopt a hybrid approach through joint-
partnership with the outside supplier? 
The answers to these questions serve to drive the organization to 
encourage competition wherever possible and expedite the subsequent procurement 
processes by scoping the contracting alternatives.  Once the requirement is approved, the 
procurement process officially begins. 
b. Conducting Market Research 
After the requirement has been identified and defined, the next activity is 
to conduct market research.  Market research is the process of collecting and analyzing 
information to determine if there are available potential suppliers and products within the 
markets to meet the organization’s needs (FAR, 2013). The degree of market research 
effort depends on the level of risk of the requirement.  For small and simple acquisitions, 
a check of past contracts may suffice.  However, for complex acquisitions, an extensive 
market research is required.  For example, under FAR market research is required for 
acquisitions with an estimated value above the simplified acquisition threshold of 
$150,000 or when there is no adequate cost information (FAR, 2013).  The result of 
market research is then used to decide if there are potential sources and products within 
the market that can satisfy the requirement.  In addition, the market survey result also 
determines if commercial items or non-development items are available to meet the 
requirement, and if not, whether the requirements can be refined such that commercial or 
non-developmental items could be incorporated at the component level (FAR, 2013).  
Lastly, the market survey can be used to establish a “ball-park” cost estimate of the 
requirement.  All these results will affect the subsequent activities and phases of the 
procurement process. 
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c. Developing Requirement Documents 
Subsequent to the completion of the market analysis and the refinement of 
requirements (if required), the next step is to develop the requirement documents.  The 
requirement documents consist of specifications, SOW, or SOO.  A specification is a 
document that spells out the detailed technical requirements and delivery schedule for the 
goods or services that a contractor is required to meet.  The SOW is a document that 
states the detailed non-specification of the work and delivery schedule that a contractor is 
required to fulfill or perform under the contract.  Both the specifications and SOW are 
often incorporated as an integral part of the resultant contract.  Specifications and SOWs 
must be written in a clear and comprehensive manner to avoid any future 
misinterpretation and disputes.  Specifying brand names in specifications and SOWs is 
not allowed, unless the word “or equivalent” is included (FAR, 2013).  The SOO, on the 
other hand, captures only the fundamental and top-level objectives of the requirement to 
allow bidders to have the flexibility to develop cost-effective and innovative solutions to 
meet the organization’s needs.  The SOO does not become part of the contract.  The 
bidders use the SOO to develop their own SOW, and the successful bidder’s SOW is 
incorporated as an integral part of the resultant contract  (FAR, 2013). 
d. Initial Consideration of Contract Type, Risk Assessment, and 
Special Terms and Conditions 
Another important factor that impacts the success of the resultant contract 
is the contract type used (e.g., fixed-price contract or cost-reimbursement contract) 
considering the nature and risk associated with the requirement.  Therefore, early 
assessment and consideration of contract type and risk assessment and exchange of such 
information during the procurement planning phase allow organizations to identify and 
address or resolve concerns early in the procurement process.  Early consideration of any 
special terms and conditions for special circumstances of the specific procurement which 
are not addressed in the standard terms and conditions is also crucial.  Unique or special 
procurement requirements may constitute including exceptions to the standard terms and 
conditions or further tailoring some of the conditions (Rendon, 2007). 
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2. Solicitation Planning 
Solicitation planning begins once the organization has gone through the 
procurement planning phase.  In this phase, solicitation documents are prepared to 
support the solicitation based on the information collected during the procurement 
planning phase (Garrett & Rendon, 2005).  The main activities in the solicitation 
planning phase consist of determining the appropriate procurement method, selecting the 
appropriate contract type, developing the solicitation documents, such as finalizing 
specifications, SOW, or SOO, and contract terms and conditions and establishing 
evaluation criteria (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
a. Determining the Appropriate Procurement Method 
The appropriate procurement method to be used varies for different types 
of goods and/or services as it is conditional on the estimated value of the requirement, the 
nature and specifications of the requirement, availability of potential suppliers and 
availability of period contract or framework agreement.  The estimated value of the 
requirement will determine the procurement method. For example, depending on the 
estimated value of the purchase, the procurement method for Singapore Government 
purchases could be by way of a small value purchase (up to S$3,000), quotations 
(between S$3000 up to S$7,000), or tender (more than S$70,000) (Ministry of Finance, 
Singapore, 2013).  Similarly, in the U.S. federal government, the procurement method 
could be by way of a micro-purchase (up to $3,000), simplified acquisition procedures 
(between $3,000 to $150,000), sealed bidding or negotiated procurement (more than 
$150,000) (FAR, 2013). 
Another important part of determining the appropriate procurement 
method involves selecting the appropriate mode of solicitation/tender procedures for a 
procurement activity.  Open competition, where any supplier can participate, is the 
preferred mode of most government organizations.  Open competition assures that 
organizations procure the goods and services in the most efficient and economical 
manner.  Government organizations, in particular, find competition crucial for ensuring 
fairness and transparency in their procurement process.  Many government organizations 
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demonstrate their commitment to open competition by limiting the circumstances 
whereby limited competition or non-competition can be used.  For example, the Federal 
Government’s Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 requires that its agencies 
and departments use “full and open competition” in purchasing goods and services.  As 
listed in FAR 6.302 (2013), there are seven exceptions to CICA.  Some of the commonly 
used exceptions include instances when only one responsible source is available and 
when there is an unusual and compelling urgency.  A Justification and Approval is 
required for exception to full and open competition (FAR, 2013).  Similarly, the 
Singapore Government has open tenders as a norm to ensure fairness and transparency in 
their procurement process as well as to obtain value for money through open competition 
(Ministry of Finance, 2013).  
b. Selecting the Appropriate Contract Type 
As previously mentioned, one crucial factor that contributes to a 
successful procurement is selecting the appropriate contract type to be used.  In the 
solicitation planning phase, government organizations use the information on contract 
types and risk assessment that they gathered from the procurement planning phase to 
decide on the appropriate contract type to be used.  The two major contract types are 
fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
The commonly used fixed-price contracts include firm-fixed price, fixed-
price contracts with economic price adjustment and fixed-price incentive contracts.  In a 
firm-fixed price contract, the contract price payable does not change regardless of 
eventual actual cost incurred by the contractor in the performance of the contract.  In a 
firm-fixed price contract, the contractor assumes all cost risk.  As for a fixed-price 
contract with economic price adjustment, the contract price payable is adjusted for 
economic uncertainties such as price of fuel, steel or copper and electricity, which tends 
to fluctuate over times.  The formula for the economic price adjustment is often pre-
agreed upon prior to contract award and stated in the contract for ease of post-
management.  Fixed-price incentive contracts, on the other hand, cater to profit 
adjustment depending on the contractor’s performance.  Contractors receive a higher 
profit if they achieve better performance results and vice versa.  Besides motivating 
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contractors to enhance their contract performance, fixed-price incentive contracts also 
serve as a deterrent for contractors not to underperform; otherwise, they will receive a 
lower profit (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
In a cost-reimbursement contract, the contractor is reimbursed for the 
allowable costs incurred in accordance with the contract terms and conditions.  Some 
commonly used cost-reimbursement contracts include cost contract, cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contract and cost-plus-incentive fee.  In a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, organizations pay 
the allowable incurred cost plus a fixed profit (fee) regardless of the actual cost of 
performing the contract.  As for cost-plus-incentive contract, an organization pays the 
allowable incurred cost plus a certain amount of fee (subject to a minimum and maximum 
fee) depending on the contractor’s effort in cost reduction. The contractor will be 
rewarded with more fees if it can perform the contract at less than the pre-agreed target 
cost and vice versa (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
Period contracts, also known as indefinite-delivery contracts, can be 
implemented in a fixed-price or cost-reimbursement contract or a hybrid of both contract 
types.  It is often used for a recurring requirement when the exact time and quantities are 
unknown upon contract award. 
While fixed-price contracts are preferred by government organizations as 
they are less risky, they may not be the appropriate contract type for a requirement where 
cost could not be reasonably estimated due to the high degree of uncertainties in 
achieving the desired organization’s needs such as research and development 
requirements.  Hence, according to the FAR, choosing the appropriate contract type is 
“generally a matter for negotiation and requires the exercise of sound judgment” (FAR, 
2013, §16.103(a), p 16.1-1). 
c. Developing Solicitation Documents 
With the requirement, appropriate procurement method, and contract type 
identified, the next step is to start developing the solicitation documents, also known as 
tender documents elsewhere, such as in the UK and Singapore.  The solicitation 
document is a document that the government organizations send to bidders (or tenderers 
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in the context of the UK and Singapore) to request for an offer or information for 
purchases.  The solicitation documents must contain all of the necessary information, 
such as the description of goods and services, specifications, SOW, and SOO, contract 
terms and conditions, delivery or performance schedules, solicitation closing date, etc., to 
enable the bidders to submit a timely and comprehensive offer or information.  The main 
types of solicitation documents include the Request for Quotation (RFQ), Invitation for 
Bids (IFB) and Request for Proposals (RFP).  The type of solicitation documents to use is 
conditional on the procurement method adopted.  For example, the U.S. federal 
government uses the RFQ for simplified acquisition procedures, while it uses the IFB and 
RFP for sealed bidding and negotiated contracts, respectively (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
d. Establishing Evaluation Criteria 
The purpose of establishing the evaluation criteria is to provide a tool to 
be used during the source selection process for objectively determining which offers 
received provide the best value to fulfill the organization’s requirement.  Evaluation 
criteria include the “key areas of importance” and “emphasis to be considered” in the 
source selection process (FAR, 2013, §15.304(b), p. 15.3-1).  Offers received must be 
evaluated solely based on the pre-determined evaluation criteria and procurement method 
to ensure a fair and transparent evaluation.  In determining best value, price alone is often 
not the primary evaluation criteria. Some non-price criteria, such as quality, availability, 
reliability, maintainability and past contractor performance are evaluated together to 
determine the best value for purchases.  Organizations may choose to award contracts on 
the basis of the lowest acceptable price, also known as Lowest Price Technically 
Acceptable (LPTA) in the U.S. federal government, or most economical offer, also 
known as a tradeoff process in the U.S. federal government.  When the evaluation 
method is based on the lowest acceptable price, the contract is awarded to the supplier 
who submitted the lowest price that meets all of the technical requirements.  However, if 
the evaluation method is based on the most economically advantageous offer, the price 
and non-price factors with relative weighting for each criterion are used to determine the 
best value for the organization’s requirement.  Regardless of which evaluation method is 
used, once the potential contractor is selected, cost or price analysis of the potential 
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contractor’s offered price is conducted to determine if the proposed price is fair and 
reasonable.  After analysis, if the contracting officer assesses that the price is not fair and 
reasonable, negotiations may be conducted with the potential contractor to lower the 
price.  
3. Solicitation 
With the completion of the solicitation planning phase, the government 
organizations start the solicitation phase by soliciting proposals or offers from industry on 
how their requirements can be met.  Solicitation documents can be issued either by mail 
or electronically on the Internet, as in the case of open solicitation or tender.  For 
example, all federal solicitations with estimated purchase values exceeding $25,000 must 
be advertised on the Government Point of Entry which is located at 
http://www.fedbizopps.gov (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The government organizations in 
Singapore are required to post open tender notices openly on the Government Electronic 
Business website located at www.gebiz.gov.sg (Ministry of Defence, 2013).  Advertising 
government opportunities electronically on the Internet benefits both the government, in 
terms of increased competition which results in lower price and better quality, and 
suppliers, in terms of enjoying broader access to government solicitations which may 
have been hidden in the past.  In a limited competition process where requirements are 
exempted from competition, solicitation documents are sent to one or a few shortlisted 
suppliers to request for offers.  Some government organizations also conduct pre-
proposal conferences for complex requirements by posting a draft solicitation document 
to facilitate the solicitation process before the release of the final solicitation document.  
Such pre-proposal conferences aim to explain complex requirements to potential bidders, 
identify new sources in the case of limited solicitations and address any queries or 
questions from the suppliers or changes from the conferences that can be made before the 
release of the final solicitation document (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
4. Source Selection 
The purpose of source selection is to select the proposal that gives the best value 
based on the pre-determined evaluation criteria and procurement method.  The main 
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activities in the source selection phase consist of evaluating the received offers and 
conducting negotiations with the potential contractor to resolve differences and reach an 
agreement that achieves the most cost-effective outcome for the organization.  Proposal 
evaluation involves assessing the bidders’ proposals based on the pre-established 
evaluation criteria and procurement method to select the proposal that offers the best 
value.  Basically, contracts can be awarded on the basis of the lowest acceptable price (or 
LPTA) or most economically advantageous offer (or tradeoff process).  In an LPTA 
process, the proposal with the lowest price that meets all the technical requirements is 
deemed to provide the best value.  In the tradeoff process, best value is defined as a 
process whereby the technical evaluation factors, collectively, are more important than 
price (FAR, 2013, §15.101), and “the perceived benefits of the higher priced proposal 
shall merit the additional cost” (FAR, 2013, §15.101-1(c), p. 15.1-1). 
Therefore, in such cases, it may be in the best interest of the government 
organization to award the contract “to other than the lowest priced offeror or other than 
the highest technically rated offeror” (FAR, 2013, §15.101-1, p. 15.1-1).  As such, FAR 
Part 15.101 requires that all solicitations indicate whether all the technical evaluation 
factors combined are significantly more important than, equal to, or significantly less 
important than price or cost (FAR, 2013, §15.101).  Negotiations are conducted with 
potential contractors whose proposals offer the best value to resolve differences and reach 
an agreement on all aspects of the contracts such as the price, schedule, special terms, 
technical issues and performance incentives.  However, in the case of LPTA, negotiations 
with potential contractors are limited to price related issues. A formal source selection 
organization is often set up to manage negotiated procurements as they involve more 
complex source selection processes.  In the U.S. federal government, the source selection 
organization is comprised of the source-selection authority (SSA), who manages the 
evaluation process and selection of the proposal with the best value, the source-selection 
advisory council, who provides advice to SSA, the source-selection evaluation team, who 
is a cross-functional team who evaluates contract proposals and the contracting officer, 
who is the point of contact with the industry who manages information exchanges with 
the bidders during the source selection phase (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
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5. Contract Administration 
Contract administration, also known as post-award administration, begins when 
the contract is awarded to the successful contractor.  Contract administration plays a 
critical role in ensuring the success of the resultant contract as it makes sure that parties 
perform in accordance with the contractual requirements.  For example, a contractor is 
required to provide services or supply goods in accordance with the contractual 
requirements, while the government organization is responsible to pay the contractor 
promptly when work has been completed.  It is important to note that issues which are 
unforeseeable at the time of award are sure to occur during the course of the contract.  
Therefore, an effective contract administration is essential to ensure that issues are 
identified and dealt with early.  The contract administration activities vary from contract 
to contract.  Generally, the more complex a contract, the more activities are expected.  
The main activities in the contract administration phase include monitoring and 
measuring the contractor’s performance and monitoring and managing the change-control 
process (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
a. Monitoring and Measuring Contractor’s Performance 
Monitoring and measuring the contractor’s performance is a process of 
observing the contractor’s performance, collecting information and measuring the 
contractor’s actual contract achievement.  The reason for observing, collecting and 
measuring achievement is to establish a basis for comparing it with the planned 
achievement stated in the contract in order to exert control.  It is the process of 
“quantifying” the work done by the contractor.  The effort involved in the monitoring and 
measuring tasks depends on the size and complexity of the contract.  In a small and 
simple contract, an occasional phone call to check on the contractor’s performance and 
visual inspection of the item will suffice.  However, for a large and complex contract, the 
organization will require extensive reports, regular progress meetings, technical reviews, 
formal testing, and audits to ascertain the contractor’s performance.  In the U.S. federal 
government, designated administrative contracting officers and contracting officer 
technical representatives (COTRs) are assigned to monitor the contractor’s performance. 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008)  The government contracting officer and COTR may be 
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stationed physically at the contractor’s premises to assess the contractor’s performance.  
The contractor’s performance is monitored and measured against general control points, 
including cost, schedule and compliance with specifications, SOW, SOO, quality, and 
compliance with terms and conditions.  A quantitative method used in contract 
administration to measure performance is earned value management (EVM).  EVM 
measures performance by comparing the actual cost, schedule, and performance results 
with established cost, schedule and performance baselines.  EVM is effective as it 
highlights potential issues relating to cost, schedule and performance.  EVM helps the 
contractor and organization to identify issues and deal with them early in the process 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
b. Management of Contract Changes 
Management of contract changes is important as it is the process for 
preventing unnecessary and unauthorized changes and incorporating necessary changes 
into the contract.  Effective contract change management is achieved through establishing 
sound and formal contract change procedures, restricting the number of people authorized 
to make and approve changes and formally documenting the changes (Rendon & Snider, 
2008).  There are three types of contract changes, namely: unilateral, bilateral and 
constructive changes.  Unilateral changes occur when the contracting officer issues a 
change without requiring any consent from the contractor.  Such unilateral changes, 
which often are administrative changes, such as a change in point of contact details and 
do not involve any monetary adjustment, are stated and legalized in the contract.  
Bilateral changes, on the other hand, require both the contractor and contracting officer to 
agree on the changes including changes on terms, specifications, schedule and cost.  
Bilateral changes are not contractually binding until the authorized personnel of both the 
contractor and organization have formally incorporated the change.  Constructive 
changes are informal agreements between the contractor and unauthorized official 
without complying with the proper legal and regulatory procedures.  Such unauthorized 
commitments include work that is often beyond the scope of the contract such as 
accelerated delivery schedule and additional work.  Effective contract change 
management serves to prevent the occurrence of such constructive changes. 
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6. Contract Closeout/Termination 
Contract closeout is the last phase of the procurement process.  In the contract 
closeout phase, a contract can either be successfully completed or suffer a termination 
under default or convenience (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
a. Contract Termination 
A contract may be terminated when the contractor defaults on the contract 
or when the government organization decides to cancel the requirement prematurely for 
any reason other than the contractor’s default.  The former is known as contract 
termination for default, while the latter is known as contract termination for convenience. 
Every government contract contains a clause on contract termination for default which 
gives the government the right to terminate the contract unilaterally, in part or in whole, 
if the contractor defaults on the contract.  In such a termination, the contractor, besides 
not being paid for any work in progress, is often required to pay any excess re-
procurement costs.  The default contractor will also receive a poor past-performance 
assessment from the government organization.  Under termination for convenience, the 
contractor is entitled to a negotiated settlement for the work done and a reasonable profit 
(FAR, 2013, §49). 
b. Contract Closeout 
Contract closeout occurs when the contractor completes the contract.  The 
closeout process includes activities such as final acceptance of goods and services, final 
payment and documentation of the contractor’s past performance report.  The extent of 
effort involved in contract closeout depends on the size and complexity of the contract 
itself.  For a small and simple contract, contract closeout is generally straightforward.  
However, for a high dollar value and complex contract, which involves progress 
payments or termination issues, the procurement officer has to ensure that the contract is 
properly closed out.  Typically, the contract is considered completed when (FAR, 2013, 
§4.8): 
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• the contractor has completed the deliveries and performed all of 
the services and the government has accepted the goods and 
services; 
• all of the optional requirements (if any) have expired; 
• the government organization has given the contractor a notice of 
complete contract termination, and 
• the government organization has ensured that all of the contractual 
obligations are fulfilled and that the post-sales support and services 
(such as warranties) are clearly defined. 
Thus far, this chapter has discussed the six phases of the public 
procurement process.  An effective procurement is not achieved by simply following the 
six phases of the procurement process.  It requires proper internal controls to be 
incorporated into the procurement process.  In the next section, a review of the literature 
covering the internal control components in the public procurement process is presented. 
C. INTERNAL CONTROL COMPONENTS 
A good internal control system is a key factor in helping organizations achieve its 
goals and missions and reduces operational problems or risks such as potential fraudulent 
activities (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 1999).  An organization’s success 
is dependent on its familiarity with the nature of risks that may occur in the environment 
and the enterprise itself, as well as by the adequate risk management.  In the past, the 
concept of internal control was focused on accounting controls with respect to 
safeguarding assets and reliability of financial records.  However, with rapidly changing 
economic and competitive environments, the scope of internal controls has expanded 
beyond the accounting arena.  Today, internal control is viewed as “a process, effected by 
an entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations, 
reporting, and compliance” (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO), 2013, p. 3). 
For example, to improve its internal control systems to combat potential fraud, 
waste and abuse, the U. S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued OMB 
Circular A-123 entitled “Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control” (OMB, 
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2004), and Congress enacted the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (Heim & 
Steinberg, 1984).  An internal control system is also viewed as the first line of defense 
against fraudulent activities (Staats, 1980).  One of the most widely-recognized and used 
models which presents good internal control practice is the COSO model, defined by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.  In fact, OMB’s 
standards of internal control systems are identical to those used by COSO.  OMB 
Circular A-123 requires that every federal agency develop and maintain internal controls 
that align with the COSO model (Candreva, 2006; OBM, 2004). 
In addition, GAO is in the process of revising the standards for internal control in 
the federal government by incorporating the new COSO internal controls standards which 
were updated in 2013 (GAO, 1999; GAO, 2013; COSO, 2013). 
The COSO, which was formed in 1985, is a joint initiative of five private sector 
organizations, namely the Financial Executives International, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, the American Accounting Association, the Institute of 
Internal Auditors and the Institute of Management Accountants.  COSO’s mission is to 
provide “thought leadership through the development of comprehensive frameworks and 
guidelines on enterprise risk management, internal control, and fraud deterrence designed 
to improve organizational performance and governance and to reduce the extent of fraud 
in organizations” (COSO, 2008, p. 1). 
With the intention of developing frameworks to provide guidance to organizations 
in their development and maintenance of systems of internal control effectively and 
efficiently, this led to the publication of the COSO model in 1992, and its subsequent 
amendments in 1994 and 2013, titled Internal Control—Integrated Framework.  
According to the COSO’s Internal Control Framework, there are five integrated 
components, namely control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information 
and communication and monitoring activities (COSO, 2013).  In the following section, a 
literature review is presented covering the key concepts and objectives of the COSO’s 
Internal Control Framework that sets the foundation of internal control standards.  The 
following section also discusses each of the five components including the fundamental 
principles supporting each of the five components. 
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1. Key Concepts of COSO’s Internal Control Framework 
• Internal control directs the organization towards the achievement of 
objectives in one or more separate but overlapping categories to include 
operations, reporting and compliance. 
• Internal control is a process.  It is not a single, separate event but a chain 
of continuous actions and activities taking place throughout the entire 
organization’s operations.  Internal control is vital to the organization in 
achieving its objectives and should form an integral part of the 
organization’s system to control and guide its operations (GAO, 1999; 
COSO, 2013). 
• Internal control is implemented by people as it is people who make 
internal controls work. Managers are responsible for establishing good 
internal controls within the organization.  Managers establish the 
objectives, devise and put in place the appropriate control measures and 
subsequently, keep track and measure the effectiveness of internal 
controls.  Internal control is not just about policy, procedure manuals, 
systems, and forms.  Internal control is about the people at every level of 
an organization.  The people at every level in the organization play an 
important role in making internal control systems work. 
• Internal control provides reasonable (not absolute) assurance in meeting 
an organization’s objectives.  An effective internal control system should 
be designed and implemented on the basis of cost and benefits.  
Regardless of how robust the internal control system is designed and 
implemented, internal control does not provide a total and complete 
guarantee that the organization’s objectives will be met.  Factors such as 
human error and errors in judgment that are beyond management’s control 
can disrupt the organization’s effort in achieving its objectives (GAO, 
1999; COSO, 2013). 
• Internal control is flexible and should be adjusted depending on the 
organization’s structure, management’s decisions, and legal or regulatory 
requirements.  
2. Objectives of the COSO Internal Control Framework 
The COSO framework is designed to provide reasonable assurance for three 
distinct but overlapping categories of objectives.  The purpose of this design is to allow 
organizations to have a directed focus on differing aspects of internal controls to meet 
their separate needs. These objectives include:  
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a. Operation Objectives 
Operation objectives focus on the “effectiveness and efficiency of the 
entity’s operations, including operational and financial performance goals, and 
safeguarding of assets against loss” (COSO, 2013, p. 3). 
b. Reporting Objectives 
Reporting objectives focus on the reliability, timeliness, and transparency 
of financial and non-financial reporting (both internal and external) (COSO, 2013, p. 3). 
c. Compliance Objectives 
Compliance objectives focus on compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations to which the organization is required to adhere (COSO, 2013). 
3. Five COSO Internal Control Components 
Internal control components are standards that support an organization in more 
effectively handling changing economic and competitive environments, evolving 
business models, and managing risk.  COSO’s Internal Control Framework consists of 
five components resulting from the way management runs a business and integrates 
internal controls within the management process.  The five components serve as a general 
framework to provide guidance to management in their effort to develop policies, 
procedures and practices that are appropriate for their operations (GAO, 1999; COSO, 
1992; COSO, 2013).  These components, when combined and operating together, 
represent the minimum level of quality standards required by an organization to achieve 
their objective.  At the same time, they provide the standards upon which a system of 
internal controls is to be measured.  The five internal control components include those 
described in the following subsections. 
a. Control Environment 
The control environment represents the “atmosphere in which members of 
the organization carry out their control activities and responsibilities” (Godwin, 2010, p. 
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91).  A positive control environment of an organization can be considered the basis for 
the success of achieving all the other internal control components as well as the success 
of achieving the organization’s objectives (COSO, 1992; GAO, 1999; COSO, 2013).  The 
control environment is defined as "the set of standards, processes and structures that 
provide the basis for carrying out internal control across the organization” (COSO, 2013, 
p. 4).  The management of the organization sets the tone at the organization depicting the 
importance of internal control including the expected ethical behavior for the entire 
organization (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013).  The internal control environment comprises 
the code of ethics and conduct of the organization, management’s philosophy and 
operating style, the organizational structure, area of authority, and reporting lines of 
authority and responsibility.  In addition, it also includes human resource policies and 
practices to attract, develop, and retain competent individuals, commitment to 
competence through performance measures, incentives and rewards to drive 
accountability for performance, and oversight groups (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
Management’s proper behavior, which displays integrity and ethical 
behavioral values, plays a key role in setting the organization’s ethical tone and provides 
guidance to staff for proper behavior and deters potential unethical behavior (GAO, 
1999).  Management must also be committed to competence through performance 
measurements and incentives and rewards to drive accountability for performance by all 
staff members.  Management must ensure that all staff members possess the right level of 
competency and skill-set to complete the work that they are assigned and provide any 
needed training.  Management’s philosophy and operating style has a significant impact 
on the environment of the organization as it determines the degree of risk the 
organization is prepared to take.  In particular, management’s beliefs and viewpoints 
towards information technology, monitoring, audits and evaluations can have a 
significant effect on the control environment component.  An organization needs to have 
a formal structure that defines key areas of authority, lines of responsibility and lines of 
reporting.  The organization must have good human resource policies and practices that 
are able to attract, develop, and retain competent individuals.  Lastly, the organization 
needs to establish relationships with oversight groups such as Congress and OMB so as to 
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enable them to carry out their governance oversight responsibilities, which can contribute 
to a good overall control environment (GAO, 1999). 
b. Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is the process of determining the likelihood that a 
specified risk will occur and the possible adverse impact on the achievement of 
objectives.  Prior to risk assessment, objectives, which are connected at different levels of 
the organization, have to be established first.  The risk assessment component is an 
ongoing iterative process that is often integrated into the planning process and consists of 
identifying and analyzing risks that could adversely impact the organization and prevent 
it from achieving its objectives.  For example, it is necessary to repeatedly ask what 
threats could prevent the organization from achieving its operational goals until all threats 
are identified.  After the risk has been identified, management is expected to assess the 
probability of its occurrence, determine the acceptable level and then define a strategy 
and its associated activities in order to maintain the desired risk level.  Therefore, risk 
assessment requires management to consider on a regular basis the effect of possible 
changes in the internal and external environment that may potentially reduce the internal 
control effectiveness.  If any changes that may negatively impact internal control 
effectiveness are identified, management must revise the strategy and the system of 
internal control in order to maintain the desired risk level (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
c. Control Activities 
Control activities are the standards, policies, procedures, and rules that the 
organization has put in place to address the risks identified under the risk assessment 
section and to keep risks to an acceptable level.  Control activities occur throughout the 
organization at all levels and in all functions.  Control activities can be in the form of a 
preventive or corrective nature.  Some common control activities adopted by 
organizations include (GAO, 1999): 
(i) conduct top level and functional level reviews of actual 
performance against established goals and objectives; 
(ii) manage human resources effectively to ensure that the staff 
possesses the required skills to accomplish the work that is 
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assigned to them.  Otherwise, training needs to be provided.  
Effective management also includes establishing good human 
resource policies and practices to attract, develop, and retain 
competent individuals and having an effective reward system to 
reward competent individuals; 
(iii) ensure physical control and safeguard of vulnerable assets such as 
cash, inventories, and essential equipment that have an impact on 
the business continuity; 
(iv) incorporate segregation of duties rules throughout the organization 
to deter fraud and inappropriate actions.  Segregation of duties 
restricts any one staff member from having complete control of an 
entire purchase. 
The organization also needs to put in place control activities for 
information systems.  The two main groups of information systems control are general 
control and application control.  General control applies to all information systems.  The 
common control activities include back-up and recovery procedures, contingency and 
disaster planning to ensure business continuity, control over inappropriate access and 
unauthorized use by hackers or staff, and control for development of new systems. 
(COSO, 1992) 
Application control, on the other hand, applies to the processing of data 
within the application software (COSO, 1992).  Effective application control assures the 
comprehensiveness, accurateness, legitimacy, and soundness of all data or transactions 
during the application processing (GAO, 1999).  General control and application control 
are tightly coupled as the effectiveness of general control can influence the effectiveness 
of application control.  Therefore, both controls are required to work hand-in-hand to 
ensure complete and accurate information processing. (COSO, 1992)  For example, if 
general control is lacking, the application control will not be able to work properly.  Due 
to the rapidly changing nature of information technology, information systems control 
must also progress to stay effective (GAO, 1999). 
d. Information and Communication 
Information is necessary for the organization and should be properly 
recorded and communicated to the right person at all levels, both internally and 
externally, in the right form and at the right time.  With this, the people concerned will be 
27 
able to adequately perform their internal control responsibilities to support the 
achievement of its objectives (GAO, 1999).  Information systems play a key role in 
internal control systems as they produce reports, including operational, financial and 
compliance-related information for management and staff so that they are able to run and 
control the organization.  Management uses the relevant and valuable information from 
these reports to support organizational operations and the decision-making process, as 
well as the functioning of other internal control components.  Organizations require 
effective communication to ensure that information flows in a timely manner to all in the 
organization, both vertically and horizontally.  Effective communication should also be 
ensured with external parties, such as customers, suppliers, regulators and shareholders 
who have a significant impact on the organization’s effort in achieving its goals.  Another 
criterion for effective communication is the ongoing process of providing, sharing and 
obtaining necessary information. Relevant, reliable and up-to-date information and 
effective communication enable management to make informed decisions (COSO, 1992, 
COSO, 2013).  Hence, organizations need to ensure that accurate, relevant, and up-to-
date information be identified, captured, and exchanged (communicated) in a timely 
manner to enable the accomplishment of an organization’s objectives.  In addition, as 
management communicates policies or information to staff and external parties, they also 
learn whether the internal controls are working as intended (GAO, 1999).   
e. Monitoring Activities 
Monitoring activities tie the other four internal control components 
together.  Monitoring activities, which can be ongoing and/or separate evaluations, are 
used to determine whether “each of the four components of internal control, including 
controls to effect the principles within each component, is present and functioning” 
(COSO, 2013, p. 5).  Monitoring activities enable management to detect changes and 
deficiencies in the other components.  Ongoing evaluations, which are built into business 
processes, provide well-timed information and assessment of the design and operation of 
internal controls.  Separate evaluations, on the other hand, with varying scope and 
frequency which are dependent on risk assessment and effective ongoing evaluations, 
provide the information and assessment of the quality of internal control performance.  
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Effective monitoring requires that any internal control deficiency detected during the 
evaluation be reported upstream and that policies and procedures are in place to ensure 
that deficiencies are promptly resolved.  Effective monitoring activities should also 
include monitoring of risks, measuring the effectiveness of the treatment of risks on a 
regular basis and taking corrective actions when needed to ensure continuous 
improvement of the system.  Therefore, monitoring activities require management to 
monitor the effectiveness of an internal control system on a regular basis.  In the event 
that internal control activities are found by managers, staff or oversight committee to be 
ineffective at adequately addressing the identified risk, there would be a need to 
communicate the findings to management and take the necessary corrective action on the 
internal control system to address the risk in order to maintain the desired risk level 
(COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
4. Fundamental Principles Supporting Internal Control Components 
Drawing on and summarizing from the discussion of COSO’s five internal control 
components in this section, 17 fundamental principles were established as shown in 
Figure 1 (COSO, 2013).  These principles, which illustrate the basic concepts associated 
with each component of internal control, are used to assess whether the five components 



















Table 1: 17 Fundamental Principles of Components of Internal Control  
 
Figure 1.  COSO’s 17 Fundamental Principles. Adapted from COSO, 2013. 
In the previous two sections, the six phases of the public procurement process and 
COSO’s five internal control components, including the relevant principles, were 
discussed and presented.  An effective internal control system is essential to the success 
of the procurement process.  The lack or absence of an effective internal control system is 
often the root cause of procurement fraud and is discussed in the next section, which 
defines and differentiates types of procurement fraud. 
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D. DEFINING AND DIFFERENTIATING TYPES OF PROCUREMENT 
FRAUD 
1. Fraud Definition 
Black’s Law Dictionary (1979) defines fraud as: 
All multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are 
resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another by false 
suggestions or suppression of the truth.  It includes all surprise, trick, 
cunning or dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated.   
There is, however, no standard definition for fraud as it varies from dictionary to 
dictionary.  ACFE defines occupational fraud and abuse as “the use of one’s occupation 
for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing 
organization’s resources or assets” (Wells, 2008, p. 8; ACFE, 2013, p. 6). Some define 
fraud as a crime of getting money by deceiving people (Cambridge Dictionaries Online, 
2013).  Others define fraud as “an act or course of deception, an intentional concealment, 
omission, or perversion of truth, to gain unlawful or unfair advantage, induce another to 
part with some valuable item or surrender a legal right, or inflict injury in some manner” 
(BusinessDictionary.com, 2013).  Fraud is a broad term, and despite the different 
definitions, fraud essentially refers to a variety of wrongful or criminal offenses that 
always involve some sort of dishonest act.  A person’s main impetus to commit fraud is 
to obtain something that is of value (in the form of money or other valuables such as 
jewelry, property, valuable assets, etc.) by lying, cheating, or tricking someone into 
thinking something that is false. 
The conditions that enable people to commit fraud are best explained by the fraud 
triangle.  It consists of three elements, namely motive (the need for committing fraud, 
such as in need of money which is often unshareable), perceived opportunity (the 
situation that allows fraud to occur, such as when internal controls are weak or lacking) 
and rationalization (the fraudster’s perceived justification that committing fraud is 
morally acceptable) (Wells, 2008; ACFE, 2013).  Fraudster refers to a person who 
commits fraud.  As these three elements are often present in every fraud incident, the key 
to deterring fraud is to remove any one of the three components in the fraud triangle 
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(ACFE, 2013).  Of the three elements, opportunity is most directly affected by the system 
of internal controls; therefore, removing opportunity will provide the most direct and 
effective tool to fraud deterrence (Cendrowski, Martin, & Petro, 2006). 
2. Differentiating Types of Procurement Fraud 
Procurement fraud is becoming an increasingly common problem globally as 
most international fraud cases are somehow linked to the procurement process through 
bid manipulation or bid rigging in order to manipulate contract awards to a particular 
favored supplier.  Procurement fraud is defined as an intentional deception to negatively 
influence any stage of the procurement process so as to make a financial gain or cause a 
loss to the organization (University College London, 2013). Procurement fraud is a 
complex problem that can occur in any phase of the procurement process of a product or 
service.  It can be committed by an outside supplier, by an employee, or by a few 
employees working together within the organization (ACFE, 2013).  It involves a wide 
range of fraudulent acts from a need recognizing scheme, solicitation irregularities and 
bid rigging during the pre-contract award phase to falsifying invoices for claims of goods 
and services that are either not delivered or not meeting contract specifications in the 
post-contract award phase (ACFE, 2013).  Procurement fraud comes in many forms, and 
it can be described and categorized in many different ways.  In this section, procurement 
fraud is categorized into two main groups: procurement fraud that involves employees 
and procurement fraud that need not involve any employees meaning that the contractors 
collude among themselves. 
a. Collusion between Employees and Contractors 
Procurement fraud often involves internal procurement staff such as an 
employee or employees working together, colluding with an outside supplier to deceive 
the employer in exchange for personal benefits such as kickbacks, bribes, gifts or other 
benefits.  The common types of such collusion between employee(s) and suppliers 
include a need recognition scheme, bid tailoring, bid manipulation, bid splitting, 
unjustified sole source award, and conflicts of interest (ACFE, 2013). 
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(1) Need Recognition Scheme. A need recognition scheme 
occurs when the employee(s) colludes with a supplier by recognizing a need for a 
particular product or service that is unnecessary and that could only be purchased from 
the supplier or fulfilled by the supplier.  In exchange, the employee receives a gratuity or 
kickback (ACFE, 2013). 
(2) Bid Tailoring. A bid tailoring scheme occurs when the 
employee, with sufficient influence over the product specification or service scope of 
work, colludes with a supplier to tailor the bid specifications so as to give an unfair 
advantage to the supplier.  The various methods of committing a bid tailoring scheme 
include drafting narrow specifications, broad specifications, vague specifications and 
change order abuse.  Drafting narrow specifications accommodates a specific supplier’s 
capability and disqualifies other competitors, which guarantees that the favored supplier 
will win the contract.  Drafting especially broad specifications, on the other hand, is to 
intentionally qualify an otherwise unqualified supplier.  Drafting vague specifications is 
to intentionally overlook certain specifications so that the contractor can increase the 
contract price through subsequent contract variation.  In a change order abuse scheme, a 
supplier submits a low bid to ensure the contract award, with the assurance from the 
employee that contract change order(s) will be effected during the course of the contract 
to compensate for the low bid (ACFE, 2013). 
(3) Bid Manipulation. A bid manipulation scheme occurs when 
the employee manipulates the bidding process to give an unfair advantage to a favored 
supplier.  Basically, a bid manipulation scheme attempts to influence the source selection 
process by limiting the pool of competitors from whom bids are sought.  Some common 
ways to commit this scheme include opening bids in too early, calling solicitations during 
public holidays, leaking pertinent information to the favored supplier in advance and 
shortening the solicitation time for submitting bids so that only the favored supplier with 
the advance information has adequate time to prepare a comprehensive bid (ACFE, 
2013). 
(4) Bid Splitting. A bid splitting scheme occurs when a large 
project is split into smaller procurements so that the total dollar value of each contract 
stays under the threshold for competitive requirements.  The result is that it facilitates 
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sole source or less competitive contract awards to a favored supplier rather than through 
the process that would produce the lowest or best price.  Bid splitting is also used to 
avoid higher level signature or approval to facilitate other schemes (ACFE, 2013). 
(5) Unjustified Sole Source Awards Scheme. An unjustified 
sole source award scheme is often used to avoid competition and award contracts directly 
to a favored supplier.  Such awards can be accomplished by ignoring competitive bidding 
requirements, falsifying sole-source justification or by splitting requirements to avoid 
competitive bidding thresholds.  In such a case, the price payable by the buyer is often 
higher than what the buyer could have obtained through competitive bidding, which is 
designed to produce the lowest or best price (ACFE, 2013). 
(6) Conflict of Interest. A potential conflict of interest occurs 
when employees, often holding a position of authority and trust, have a personal interest 
that is in conflict with their official responsibilities.  Such employees may make decisions 
in their job that give preference to a company in exchange for personal benefit to 
themselves or their families.  For example, an employee who is the purchasing approving 
authority approves the contract award to an unqualified company in exchange for gifts 
from the company or a future employment (usually with very attractive remuneration) by 
the company for themselves or their families (ACFE, 2013). 
b. Employees Acting Alone 
Another form of fraud involving employees is committed without any 
involvement of an outside supplier.  The common types of this fraud include false 
accounting scams such as a shell company scheme as well as conflicts of interest (AFCE, 
2013). 
(1) Shell Company Scheme. A shell company scheme occurs 
when an employee or group of employees working together establish a shell company 
account in the company’s procurement systems so as to steal from the employer via 
fraudulent contracts, invoices, and/or payments.  Typically, a shell company scheme 
involves the provision of fictitious services rather than the purchase of fictitious goods as 
it is more difficult to verify that the services have not been performed.  However, there is 
another sub-category of the shell company scheme which involves the purchase of goods 
34 
known as a pass-through scheme.  In a pass-through scheme, instead of buying the goods 
directly from the vendor, the employee sets up a shell company to buy the goods for the 
organization. The employee then resells the goods from the shell company to the 
organization at an inflated price (ACFE, 2013). 
(2) Conflicts of Interest. As described earlier, a potential 
conflict of interest occurs when employees make job-related decisions that give 
preference or favor to a company in exchange for personal benefit to themselves or their 
families.  However, such conflicts of interest can also be committed by the employee 
alone with no supplier involvement.  For example, an employee awards a contract to an 
unqualified company where the employee holds a significant amount of shares of that 
company or where the employee’s family member is an employee of that company.  For 
the latter example, awarding the contract to the company may assure the survivability of 
that company, which will indirectly secure the employment of the employee’s family 
member with that company (ACFE, 2013). 
c. Collusion among Contractors or Contractor Acting Alone 
Another main group of procurement fraud is committed by contractor(s) 
with no involvement of internal procurement staff.  Often, competitors of the same 
industry may collude to defeat competition and to inflate the prices of goods and services 
artificially (ACFE, 2013).  A common type of this procurement fraud is bid rigging.  
Another example of procurement fraud committed by a contractor acting alone is product 
substitution (ACFE, 2013). 
(1) Bid Rigging. Bid rigging is a form of price fixing whereby 
competing companies coordinate their price proposals (OECD, 1993).  It occurs when 
competing companies collude so that a competing company can secure a contract for 
goods or services at a pre-agreed price.  Almost all forms of bid-rigging schemes have 
one thing in common: an agreement among some or all of bidders which predetermines 
the winning bidder and limits or eliminates competition.  Bid rigging limits or eliminates 
true competition, as it predetermines the winning company, and the rigged price will be 
unfairly high.  There are five common types of bid rigging: bid suppression, 
complementary bidding, bid rotation, market division and subcontracting, which are 
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described in the following paragraphs (ACFE, 2013; Office of the Connecticut Attorney 
General, 2009). 
(2) Bid Suppression. Bid suppression occurs when some of the 
“competing” companies agree not to submit a bid so that another company can win the 
contract (ACFE, 2013). 
(3) Complementary Bidding. Complementary bidding, on the 
other hand, occurs when some of the “competing” bidders agree to submit bids that are 
intended not to be successful, so that another conspiring company can win the contract.  
For example, some of the “competing” bidders submit offers that they know the buyer 
will reject because the price is too high or the terms are unacceptable in order to create a 
perception of legitimate bidding while ensuring that a pre-arranged “competitor” will win 
the bid (ACFE, 2013). 
(4) Bid Rotation. Bid rotation refers to the practice of 
competitors taking turns to win a contract award.  Each conspiring company is designated 
to be the successful bidder on certain contracts, while other conspiring companies are 
designated to win other contracts.  Bid rotation is, in effect, a form of market allocation 
where competitors are entitled to their “fair share” of the total business without having to 
truly compete with others for that business.  Like subcontracting arrangements, bid 
rotation schemes are often employed in combination with bid suppression. For example, 
company A might agree to submit a high bid that is sure not to win the job in order to let 
company B win the job at a higher price. In exchange, company B will agree to do the 
same at the next offering. This enables company A and company B to effectively take 
turns to win the contract, while giving the impression of legitimate competitive bidding. 
The result is that both companies are able to charge more for their services.  The buyers 
will lose the benefit of true competitive bidding, and the price payable by the buyers will 
often be higher than the buyer could have obtained through true competitive bidding 
(AFCE, 2013). 
(5) Market Division. Market division schemes are agreements 
among competing firms whereby the competitors divide the market among themselves.  
In such schemes, the competitors basically divide the market according to geographic 
area or based on type of customers.  In the agreement, the competitors agree not to 
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compete against each other’s designated portion of the market.  The result of these 
schemes is that the competing firms will either not bid against each other, or they will 
submit intentionally high prices to bid solicitations in a geographical area that is not 
allocated to them.  In such cases, the buyer will lose the benefit of true competition and 
end up paying a higher price than the buyer would have obtained through true 
competitive bidding (ACFE, 2013). 
(6) Subcontracting Fraud. Subcontracting fraud occurs when 
one company gets awarded a contract and then awards subcontracts to the other 
conspiring companies in exchange for not submitting a winning bid.  Similar to other bid 
rigging frauds, such subcontracting arrangements cause the buyer to lose the benefits of 
true competition and end up paying a higher price than the buyer would have obtained 
through true competitive bidding (Office of the Inspector General, 2013). 
(7) Delivering Sub-Standard Goods (Product Substitution). 
Another form of fraud, which is committed by a contractor acting alone, occurs when the 
contractor delivers goods of inferior quality. Often some parts of the goods were 
mislabeled so as to cover up the sub-standard nature of the goods (Grant & Eisenhofer, 
P.A, 2013). 
With the knowledge gained from the previous three sections concerning 
the six phases of the procurement process, COSO’s five internal controls components and 
the various types of procurement fraud, the next section will discuss the application of the 
COSO internal control components in the procurement process so as to maintain the 
integrity of the procurement process and protect public resources against procurement 
fraud. 
E. APPLICATION OF COSO INTERNAL CONTROL COMPONENTS IN 
THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
According to ACFE (2013), “The perception of detection, not internal control, per 
se, is arguably the strongest deterrent to fraud” (AFCE, 2013, p. 1.205).  People who 
think that fraudulent acts will be detected often will be discouraged from committing the 
acts.  Therefore, a strong, thorough and functioning internal control system is essential 
for fraud prevention.  As discussed in the previous section, there are 17 fundamental 
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principles associated with the five COSO internal control components.  These principles 
can be used to assess whether the five COSO internal components are in place and 
functioning effectively.  The application of each of the 17 principles in the procurement 
process is discussed in the following subsections (COSO, 2013). 
1. Control Environment 
a. Principle 1: Organization Demonstrates Commitment to Integrity 
and Ethical Values 
Management, when establishing and setting the ethical tone of the 
organization, must be committed to minimizing procurement fraud.  For example, 
organizations such as the U.S. federal government and National Contract Management 
Association (NCMA) have established codes of ethics as shown in Appendix A and 
Appendix B, respectively, that define the acceptable ethical behavior that their employees 
are required to uphold.  ACFE has also established a code of ethics as shown in Appendix 
C to which all certified fraud examiners are required to adhere.  Effective control starts 
from the top management level.  Unless management leads by example to demonstrate 
their firm commitment to safeguard procurement integrity and uphold ethical values, 
employees are not likely to commit to or comply with the ethical code and standards.  For 
example, when every employee and contractor is required to read and sign the established 
code of ethics, management must show its commitment by signing the code and be seen 
doing so (COSO, 1992; ACFE, 2013; COSO, 2013). 
b. Principle 2: Exercises Oversight Responsibility 
An auditor must be given the power and mandate to perform their 
oversight responsibilities independently.  For example, in the U.S. Government, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense Inspector General 
(DoD IG) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) are the three independent and 
objective auditing agencies that perform audits on DoD contracts.  GAO works for 
Congress, and they support congressional oversight by auditing federal government 
contracts and investigating allegations of illegal and improper activities including 
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procurement fraud (GAO, 2013).  The DoD IG, on the other hand, works for the 
Secretary of Defense, and their main task includes acting as the chief advisor to the 
Secretary of Defense on matters relating to DoD fraud as well as conducting audits on 
DoD contracts and investigations to combat fraud (DoD IG, 2013).  The DCAA is under 
the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and is responsible for 
auditing all DoD contracts (DCAA, 2013).  Similarly in the Singapore government, the 
Auditor-General’s Office (AGO) is the “national auditor” that reports directly to the 
President of Singapore and parliament, and its primary responsibility is to audit the 
Government, Statutory Boards and other bodies managing public funds.  These agencies 
have a commonality in that they have the independent authority to conduct audits and 
investigations so that they can adequately perform the necessary governance and 
oversight responsibilities (AGO, 2013). 
c. Principle 3: Establishes Structure, Authority and Responsibility 
The procurement organization’s structure, which includes areas of 
authority and line of reporting and responsibility, is a critical part of the procurement 
function because, without it, the organization cannot control the flow of procurement 
activities.  Organizations are often faced with questions such as: To what extent is 
procurement centralized or decentralized? To what extent is decentralized procurement 
affecting the implementing of effective control management?  What is the appropriate 
reporting line? Is the level of authority and responsibility properly assigned? Who is 
involved in the procurement?  Do the levels of procurement skills match the procurement 
portfolio?  Depending on the organization’s needs and the level of risk that it is prepared 
to take, its procurement office can generally be organized into three structures, namely, 
centralized, decentralized or a hybrid model, and each structure has its own advantages 
and disadvantages. 
In a centralized procurement structure, decision-making comes from the 
top, and its purchasing activities are handled by a central procurement group.  A strong 
and effective centralized procurement team enables the organization to achieve better 
value through economies of scale by effectively consolidating spending across the 
organization.  An important advantage of a centralized procurement structure is that it 
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encourages good transparency provisions such as effective management controls, 
efficient documenting of procurement contracts, and activities, clearer audit trails and 
knowledge sharing.  Such transparency features enable purchases to be checked for 
evidence of procurement fraud or any illegal activities.  The procurement employees of a 
centralized structure are also more easily trained, and are, therefore, more skillful and 
knowledgeable with the proper and efficient use of the procurement rules and regulations 
(COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
However, a centralized structure is more bureaucratic, and end-users are 
not able to enjoy the flexibility and speed that is possible from a decentralized structure.  
While decentralized purchasing is more flexible and responsive to the end-users’ needs 
due to its informal reporting line and responsibility where decision-making happens at a 
lower organizational level, it is more difficult to ensure that efficient practices and 
policies are consistent and to achieve tight management control in this model, which may 
potentially create the opportunity for fraudulent acts.  The inconsistencies in the 
purchasing process across various departments or business units become a challenge for 
organizations to have effective control management (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
A hybrid model, in which some purchasing, such as usually the higher 
value and more complex purchases, is done at the centralized procurement team level and 
purchasing, such as the low value and simple purchases, is done at the respective 
departmental level, may be considered.  A survey conducted by Johnson and Leenders 
(2004) in the U.S. and Canada included 67% of the 287 respondents from large 
international organizations and showed that organizations are moving towards the hybrid 
structure (Johnson & Leenders, 2004).  The hybrid structure enhances the organization’s 
leverage through economies of scale, and at the same time, improves the service level to 
the end-users.  Many organizations embarking on a goal-driven performance optimization 
strategy are delegating more authority and responsibility to front-line managerial levels.  
However, it is important for organizations to ensure that responsibility and accountability 
are delegated only to qualified and ethical procurement staff employees and are given the 
ability and authority to respond accordingly to changing priorities of the organization.  
Delegation also means turning over the management control to a lower managerial level, 
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so it is important that organizations only delegate to the extent of achieving the objectives 
(COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
d. Principle 4: Demonstrates Commitment to Competence 
Organizations must show commitment to attract, develop and retain 
competent and ethical procurement professionals in alignment with the organization’s 
objectives (COSO, 2013).  One of the easiest ways to establish a strong and moral tone in 
the organization is to hire morally sound procurement employees.  The hiring process of 
employees who hold corruption prone positions, such as the procurement staff, should be 
conducted in a more thorough manner, including detailed background checks and 
interviews to ensure that they have adequate skills and the right moral mindset to perform 
the duties.  In the context of procurement, employees holding corruption prone positions 
refer to employees, such as contracting officer, program manager, and COR, involved in 
the acquisition process as they are more prone to the risk of committing fraud.  Next, 
organizations need to ensure that these qualified and ethical employees, who are 
sometimes placed in ethical dilemmas, strive to perform their job without resorting to 
fraudulent acts. 
Therefore, well-defined job descriptions and achievable performance goals 
must be communicated to the employees.  Performance goals should also be constantly 
reviewed to ensure that they are not unrealistic.  Regular training and re-training of the 
procurement staff on effective procurement techniques and ethical behavior is also 
important to improve the employees’ procurement professionalism and ensure that they 
maintain the skills to perform effectively.  The procurement staff must also be trained and 
kept current on the organization’s policies and procedures regarding how to respond 
when faced with ethical dilemmas and to emphasize the importance of behaving ethically 
at work.  The standards in hiring qualified and ethical employees and the training policies 
established show commitment by the organization in attracting and developing competent 
and ethical people.  Finally, rewarding outstanding performance and ethical conduct 
through advancement and better remuneration packages based on performance appraisals 
shows that the organization is committed to retaining competent and ethical employees.  
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It is also important to ensure that the remuneration package of a public procurement 
professional is competitive with the private sector (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
e. Principle 5: Enforces Accountability 
It is important that organizations ensure that employees are held 
accountable for their internal control responsibilities.  Sufficient punishment for 
procurement fraud or illegal conduct is obviously a critical element to an effective 
internal control environment.  A well-defined set of disciplinary measures must be 
established and communicated effectively to all employees, and it must apply to anyone 
who is found guilty of fraud or corruption.  Such consistent disciplinary measures will 
enhance the credibility of the organization and deter people from committing fraudulent 
acts (COSO, 2013). 
2. Risk Assessment 
a. Principle 6: Specifies Suitable Objectives 
The organization should specify clear objectives to facilitate the 
identification and assessment of risks relating to objectives (COSO, 2013).  In setting 
objectives, an organization must establish a mission statement which spells out the 
organization’s goals and guides its actions and decision-making and links to all activities 
throughout the procurement process and organization.  An effective mission statement 
not only consists of the purpose statement, but more importantly, it explains the value 
statements that the members of the organization must uphold and practice throughout the 
procurement process.  Value statements guide and motivate the employees in performing 
their procurement work ethically.  Examples of values include a commitment to honesty, 
integrity, and transparency, and so on.  A mission statement should be challenging but 
achievable and measurable.  For example, the objective of procurement activities within 
the government organization is to achieve timely acquisition of goods and services based 
on the guiding principles of fairness, transparency, integrity and value for money to meet 
the organization’s overall needs.  Finally, mission statements, once established, must be 
well communicated to the procurement staff (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
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b. Principles 7 and 8:  Identifies and Analyzes Risks (including 
Fraud Risk) 
The organization should identify risks including potential for fraud that 
might keep the organization from achieving its objectives and analyze risks, including 
fraud risk, so as to decide how the risk should be managed (COSO, 2013).  Risk can be 
categorized as internal, such as project complexity, inadequate project planning and 
fraud, and external risks, such as technology changes, weather and economic conditions 
(COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013).  There is risk in every phase of the procurement process, 
with certain risks having a potentially greater impact on the organization’s objectives.  
Therefore, organizations must ensure that the risk identification and analysis process is a 
comprehensive and ongoing iterative process.  Table 1 summarizes some of the typical 
risks and possible fraud vulnerabilities in each procurement phase (ACFE, 2013; Office 




Typical Risks and Possible Fraud Vulnerability 
Procurement 
Planning 
• Need Recognition Scheme 
• Bid Tailoring 
• Inadequate Market Survey 
• Inadequate Project Planning 
Solicitation 
Planning 
• Inappropriate Procurement Method 
• Inappropriate Contract Type 
• Use of Inadequate or Inappropriate Evaluation Criteria 
• Inadequate Consideration of Special Terms and 
Conditions 
• Unjustified Sole Source Award Scheme 
• Bid Manipulation 
• Bid Splitting 
Solicitation • Bid Manipulation 
• Bid Rigging 
• Subcontracting Fraud 
• Insufficient Bids Received 




• Conflict of Interest 
• Failure to Comply With Established Evaluation Criteria 
• Selection of Unqualified Contractor 
• Failure to Negotiate a Reasonable Contract Price and 
Terms and Conditions 
• Insufficient Budget 
Contract 
Administration 
• Cost Overrun 
• Fluctuation of Foreign Exchange Rate 
• Schedule Delay 
• Contractor Failing Acceptance Test Repeatedly 
• Delivery of Sub-Standard Goods (Product Substitution) 
• Unable to Reach Agreement on The Negotiated 
Settlement 
• Shell Company Scheme 
Contract 
Closeout 
• No Proper Closeout 
 
Table 1.   Examples of Typical Risks and Fraud Vulnerability in Procurement Process. 
Adapted from Office of the Inspector General, n.d. 
These risks bring about consequences such as limited competition, higher 
acquisition cost, delivered goods and services not meeting the user’s requirements, 
inability to enjoy economies of scale and damage of an organization’s reputation and 
image due to improper use of public fund and resources.  After identifying the risks, 
organizations should analyze the significance of each risk and probability of the risk 
occurring for the purpose of determining how the risk could be managed.  A risk that 
does not have a significant impact on the organization and has a low probability of 
occurring may not warrant serious concern.  However, a risk that has a significant impact 
on the organization with a high probability of occurring will usually demand considerable 
attention by the organization (COSO, 1992). 
c. Principles 9: Identifies and Analyzes Significant Change 
The organization should identify and assess changes that could 
significantly impact the system of internal control to adequately manage the risk (COSO, 
2013).  Risk management involves developing the effective internal control targeted at a 
specific identified risk.  Typically, organizations have four approaches to risk 
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management: mitigate it, transfer it, avoid it or accept it (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The 
best approach to managing risk such as fraud in general that has a significant impact on 
the organization but lower likelihood of occurring is to mitigate it by developing internal 
controls tailored to the specific risk.  For risks, such as cost overrun, schedule delay and 
unjustified sole-source award scheme that have a high likelihood of occurring and a high 
significant impact on the organization, the best approach is to avoid them through 
effective internal controls.  For example, to avoid risk such as an unjustified sole-source 
award scheme, an organization’s strategy should restrict the circumstances whereby non-
competition can be used.  
However, in some situations, avoidance may not be feasible for risk with a 
high likelihood of occurring and significant impact on the organization.  For example, the 
best approach to manage risk, such as exchange rate fluctuation, is to transfer it through 
currency hedging.  Current hedging is a financial instrument to protect against currency 
exchange rate risk (Western Union Business Solutions, 2013).  As for risk that has a low 
impact on the organization, the approach would be to either mitigate or accept it 
depending on whether it is cost-effective to bear the risk.  However, considering the 
possible changes in the external and internal environment, risks that are assessed to have 
a low probability of occurrence or low impact on the organization today may not be true 
tomorrow.  Thus, organizations should consider on a regular basis the impact of possible 
changes in the external and internal environment that may make an internal control 
ineffective, and when necessary, the organization should revise the strategy and the 
system of internal control so as to maintain the desired risk level (COSO, 1992; COSO, 
2013). 
3. Control Activities 
Principles 10, 11 and 12: Selects and develops control activities and 
general control over technology, and deploys through policies and 
procedures 
The organization should select, develop and deploy policies and procedures to 
address the risks that are identified during the risk assessment phase, to an acceptable and 
desired level (COSO, 2013).  Besides segregation of duties, some other common control 
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activities adopted by organizations to manage fraud risks in the procurement process 
include the conflict of interest rule, mandatory job rotation for procurement professionals, 
whistleblower systems, and regular training on the organization’s code of ethics for 
procurement professionals.  Employees are required to sign a statement that they have 
read and understand the code of ethics policies.  Management must document all control 
activities in the procurement manual and ensure that all employees have access to it and 
that employees clearly understand the manual.  Management must also conduct regular 
reviews of the effectiveness of the control activities and make the necessary changes 
where control failures are identified. With the widespread use of e-procurement to 
accelerate purchase approval and payment cycles, general controls are required over the 
procurement system to ensure that the system configuration is in compliance with the 
control activities.  For example, under segregation of duties, the person who approves the 
award of purchases must not be the person who approves payment to the contractor.  In 
this case, organizations need to establish control activities in the procurement system to 
prevent any unauthorized access by the person who approves the award of purchase to the 
payment module of the procurement system (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
4. Information and Communication 
Principles 13, 14 and 15: Uses relevant information and communicates 
internally and externally 
The organization should obtain relevant, accurate and up-to-date information and 
communicate it effectively and promptly to managers, staff and external parties to 
support the achievement of its objectives efficiently and effectively (COSO, 2013).  In 
the context of fraud prevention in the procurement process, pertinent information and 
effective communication are important to ensure that essential information, such as 
objectives, control activities and compliance information, is not buried within 
unnecessary information.  Through timely and accessible communication, management 
ensures that all employees know the importance of observing and upholding the internal 
control rules, understand their roles in the internal control system, understand the 
organization’s value statement and code of ethics and understand that internal control has 
a high priority as well as understand the disciplinary measures for violations of internal 
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controls (ACFE, 2013).  Effective communication flows in all directions and at all levels 
within the organization (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013).  It is important that organizations 
provide an independent hotline for employees or external parties to report to someone in 
authority about alleged dishonest activities or misconduct taking place in the 
organization.  Employees and the public who might want to report a fraudulent act are 
more inclined to do so if a hotline is operated independently.  Effective communication 
for external parties such as suppliers must also be in place to allow exchange of pertinent 
information in achieving the organization’s objective.  Without an effective 
communication system, the internal control system is vulnerable to failure.  Thus, it is 
important that constant review of the effectiveness of the communication procedures be 
performed. 
5. Monitoring Activities 
Principles 16 and 17: Conducts ongoing and/or separate evaluations 
and evaluates and communicates deficiencies 
In the context of fraud prevention within the procurement process, monitoring 
activities determine if the other four internal control components are effective in deterring 
fraudulent acts.  Ongoing evaluations of the daily activities of the procurement staff by 
managers and employees, which are built into the business process, include verifying and 
ensuring that the staff understand and comply with the code of ethics, verifying the 
accuracy of financial information, and verifying and ensuring that payment to a supplier 
is in compliance with the contract.  Separate evaluations on the internal control system, 
which are conducted from time to time, are often independent and conducted by 
governance or audit departments.  Such separate evaluations include verifying that the 
segregation of duties policy is effective and that the procurement staff is abiding by the 
policy or verifying that the ongoing evaluations by managers are properly carried out.  
Finally, any internal control activity found to be ineffective or inadequate in addressing 
the identified risk in the procurement process needs to be reported upstream and 




compliance with the segregation of duties policy, immediate action must be taken to align 
the procurement system with the segregation of duties policy (COSO, 1992; COSO, 
2013). 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the basis of the research, which consists of the six phases of the 
public procurement process, the five COSO internal control components, the types of 
procurement fraud and the application of the internal control components to the 
procurement processes were reviewed and summarized.  The six phases of the public 
procurement process are procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source 
selection, contract administration and contract closeout.  These processes working 
together serve as guidelines for the procurement staff to purchase public goods and 
services in a cost-effective and economical manner.  The five COSO internal control 
components consist of control environment, risk assessment, control activities, 
information and communication and monitoring activities.  An effective system of 
internal controls requires that each of the five components and relevant principles be 
present and functioning, and that the five components be operated together in an 
integrated manner.  All of the five components, including their relevant principles, will 
collectively help reduce the organization’s risk of not achieving its objectives at an 
acceptable and desirable level.  This chapter also defined procurement fraud, which was 
followed by the discussion of the different types of procurement fraud.  Essentially, 
procurement fraud can be committed in a variety of ways and can occur during any phase 
of the procurement process.  Procurement fraud can be broadly categorized into two main 
types: procurement fraud that involves employees and procurement fraud that does not 
involve employees.  Often, procurement fraud is committed by employees in collusion 
with an outside supplier.  Examples of this type of procurement fraud include need 
recognition, bid tailoring, bid manipulation, bid splitting, unjustified sole source award 
and conflict of interest.  Another common procurement fraud is when competing 
suppliers collude among themselves through bid rigging. 
Lastly, proper incorporation and enforcement of the COSO internal control 
components, which include the 17 fundamental principles, into the public procurement 
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process is essential to maintain the integrity of the procurement process and protect 
public resources.  People who think that fraudulent acts will be detected often will think 
twice before committing such acts (ACFE, 2013).  Therefore, a strong, thorough and 
functioning internal control system is essential for procurement fraud deterrence.  The 
presence of the 17 fundamental principles associated with the five internal components in 
the internal control system helps ensure that the internal control system is in place and 
functioning effectively. 
Based on the foundation built by this research, the next chapter begins by 
presenting 20 case studies of procurement fraud incidents, followed by a review and 
analysis of the internal control weaknesses in each of the procurement fraud incidents. 
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III. CASE STUDIES OF PROCUREMENT FRAUD INCIDENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews and analyzes 20 case studies of actual procurement fraud 
incidents and discusses the internal control weaknesses that contributed to the fraudulent 
activities.  Essentially, for each case study the chapter reviews and analyzes the internal 
control weaknesses in the procurement processes that caused the fraud incidents and the 
types of fraud schemes used by the fraudsters.  Fraudsters refer to the people who commit 
the fraudulent acts. 
B. CASE STUDIES 
In this section, 20 procurement fraud case studies, which are drawn mainly from 
the Encyclopedia of Ethical Failure (Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 
2013), are presented.  The background and details of the procurement fraud case studies 
are provided in Appendix D. 
The next section presents in each case study, an analysis and discussion of the 
internal control weaknesses as well as the type of fraud scheme used by the fraudsters.  
Due to the lack of background for some case studies, reasonable assumptions were made 
to facilitate the analysis and discussion. 
C. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
1. Case Study 1 (Navy Bribery Scheme) 
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Principles 1, 3 and 4 (demonstrates commitment to integrity and ethical 
values; establishes structure, authority, and responsibility; and demonstrates commitment 
to competence, respectively), which are associated with the control environment 
component, were lacking in this case study.  The tone at the top depicting the importance 
of integrity and ethical values were lacking (specifically at a U.S. Navy readiness center).  
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This attitude was apparent considering that the line of workers who colluded in the 
scheme reached the supervisory level.  Typically, employees who feel that top 
management is not upholding ethical values or showing a commitment to standards are 
more prone to commit fraud.  In this case study, the procurement in the U.S. Navy 
readiness center occurred in a highly decentralized organizational structure.  The tone set 
by the U.S. Navy on the importance of internal control, which included the expected 
ethical behavior for all staff, was also poor due to its failure to establish an effective 
organizational structure for managing decentralized procurement.  Essentially, the U.S. 
Navy failed to establish an effective organizational structure to ensure that consistent and 
efficient practices and policies were followed for decentralized procurement to achieve 
tight and effective management control.  The U.S. Navy also did not demonstrate a strong 
commitment to develop and retain competent and ethical procurement employees.  For 
example, the U.S. Navy former civilian employee claimed that the workers at the center 
had resorted to committing the fraudulent acts because they were pressured to meet 
unrealistic goals which were not achievable through the normal procurement process 
(Moran, 2013).  These control weaknesses increased fraud vulnerability throughout the 
procurement process. 
Principles 7, 8 and 9 (identifies and analyzes risk; assesses fraud risk and 
identifies and analyzes significant change, respectively), which are associated with the 
risk assessment component, were lacking in this case study.  There is a Chinese saying 
“heaven is high and the emperor is far away” (Zhao, 2006) which refers to a situation 
whereby the central authorities have little control or oversight over the local affairs as 
that control is far away from the central authorities.  Recognizing that there can be some 
truth in this saying, it is thus safe to assume that it is difficult to ensure consistent and 
efficient practices and policies and achieve tight management control in a decentralized 
procurement structure.  In addition, the risk of fraudulent acts occurring in a 
decentralized procurement structure is often expected to be higher compared to a 
centralized procurement structure.  For example, the U.S. Navy former civilian employee 
was able to exclude the yearly audits and contracting officer representative (COR) 
requirements as normally required from the contract (Moran, 2013), and no one reviewed 
his work.  Moreover, according to the Association of Certified Frame Examiners, 
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procurement fraud is six times more likely to occur during the contract administration 
phase than in the pre-contract award phase (ACFE, 2013).  In view of this, the 
organization failed to identify the risks associated with a decentralized procurement 
structure, especially in the contract administration phase, and also failed to decide how 
the risks should be managed. 
Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities; and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in this case study.  First, the U.S. Navy failed to adopt 
some common control activities such as segregation of duties, mandatory job rotation or 
vacation for employees holding corruption prone positions.  For example, the U.S. Navy 
former civilian employee was given the authority to determine the requirement and create 
the statement of work during the procurement planning phase; approve the purchase and 
award contract during the source selection phase and, at the same time, administer the 
contract during the contract administration phase (Moran, 2013).  This was clearly a 
violation of the segregation of duties rule.  Another potential control activities weakness 
in this case study was that the U.S. Navy failed to establish a relationship with the 
oversight groups, such as auditors or governing department, for them to carry out their 
oversight responsibilities for decentralized procurement.  Instead, the yearly audit 
requirement was simply removed by the U.S. Navy former civilian employee with just 
the stroke of a pen.  Lastly, there was a lack of a “checks and balances” system in the 
organization’s procurement process.  For example, the U.S. Navy former civilian 
employee intentionally wrote the contracts vaguely, and there was no system of “checks 
and balances” to verify the contract before release (Moran, 2013).  These control 
activities weaknesses increased fraud vulnerability in the procurement planning, source 
selection and contract administration phases.  
Principle 16 (conducts ongoing and/or separate evaluations), which is 
associated with the monitoring activities component, was lacking in this case study.  For 
example, the fact that the scheme went unnoticed for a decade and no staff reported this 
misconduct revealed that the ongoing evaluation procedure was not functioning 
effectively (Moran, 2013).  The failure of the ongoing evaluation procedure was largely  
 
52 
due to the fact that the scheme involved collusion from the line workers to the supervisor 
level.  This control weakness increased fraud vulnerability throughout the procurement 
process. 
b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal controls in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for the staff at the U.S. Navy readiness center to 
collude with the contractors to commit bid tailoring and a need recognition scheme.  
Using bid tailoring and a need recognition scheme, the staff at the center when 
determining the procurement requirement had intentionally drafted a vague specification 
to overlook certain requirements so that they could exploit the vagueness of the contract 
to request “additional services” that were not necessary and not performed (Moran, 
2013).  Specifically, the staff at the center had defined these “additional services” under 
the pretext of services that were allowable under the contract but were not necessary and 
not performed.  The payment for these “additional services” was then used to pay for the 
bribe items received by the staff (Moran, 2013). 
2. Case Study 2 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Fraud)  
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Principle 1 (demonstrates commitment to integrity and ethical values), 
which is associated with the control environment component, was lacking in this case 
study.  The tone at the top depicting the importance of integrity and ethical values 
appeared to be lacking considering that the fraud involved several public officials within 
the same organization.  Besides the poor moral tone set at the top, the behavior of co-
workers can also influence employees’ ethical conduct.  In this case, the other co-workers 
after observing the former program manager of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
engaging in misconduct would be more likely to commit fraudulent acts or collude with 
him.  This control weakness increased fraud vulnerability throughout the procurement 
process. 
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Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in this case study.  First, the organization failed to 
adopt some common control activities such as segregation of duties, mandatory job 
rotation or vacation for employees holding corruption prone positions.  For example, the 
former program manager was given the authority to issue orders for goods and services 
against government term contracts as well as the authority to certify the completion of 
goods and services (Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 2013).  Being the program 
manager, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ employee would also have had the authority 
to oversee the development of the specifications.  If so, the former program manager had 
total control of the purchase, and this was a violation of the segregation of duties rule.  
Second, there was also a lack of a “checks and balances” system in the source selection 
phase.  For example, the lack of independent checks or evaluation of price or quotations 
from the contractor and sub-contractors resulted in the inflated and falsified invoices.  
These control weaknesses increased fraud vulnerability in the procurement planning, 
source selection, and contract administration phases. 
Principle 16 (conducts ongoing and/or separate evaluations), which is 
associated with the monitoring activities component, was lacking in this case study.  The 
organization failed to build into the procurement process a systematic standardized 
ongoing evaluation in determining whether the employees were complying with the 
procurement and ethical policies and rules.  The lack of effective ongoing evaluations and 
the absence of management review caused the fraudulent activities to proliferate 
throughout the procurement process.  The separate evaluations, which were supposedly to 
be conducted by the auditors or governance department when the ongoing evaluations 
were not effective, were also not implemented effectively based on the fact that the 
fraudulent acts were discovered five years later.  The ineffectiveness of separate 
evaluations increased fraud vulnerability in the contract administration phase. 
b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal controls in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff to collude 
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with contractors to commit bid tailoring and bid rigging (sub-contracting fraud scheme).  
Using bid tailoring, the former program manager, along with his other colleagues, when 
determining the procurement requirement may have intentionally drafted narrow 
specifications that accommodated the conspiring contractors’ capabilities and disqualified 
other competitors so as to guarantee that the conspiring contractors would win the 
contracts.  At the contractors’ end, using a bid rigging fraud scheme (sub-contracting 
fraud), these contractors conspired and agreed that when a particular company was 
awarded a contract, it would then award sub-contracts to the other conspiring companies 
in exchange for not submitting a winning bid. 
3. Case Study 3 (Bribery and Fraud Lands Program Manager in Jail) 
and Case Study 4 (Misconduct of a First Lieutenant) 
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in both case studies.  The organizations failed to adopt 
some common control activities such as segregation of duties, mandatory job rotation, or 
vacation for employees holding corruption prone positions.  For example, in order for the 
program manager (PM) (in case study 3) and the First Lieutenant (in case study 4) to 
successfully commit the fraudulent acts, they were most probably given the authority to 
determine the procurement requirement, to issue orders for goods and services against 
government term contracts as well as the authority to certify the completion of goods and 
services.  As such, both the PM and the First Lieutenant had total control of the purchase, 
and this was a violation of the segregation of duties rule.  This control weakness 
increased fraud vulnerability in the contract administration phase.  There was also a lack 
of a “checks and balances” system in the source selection and contract administration 
phases.  For example, the lack of independent checks (or evaluation) of price or 
quotations from the contractor and sub-contractors in case study 3 resulted in the inflated 




and invoices submitted by the contractors resulted in the payment for goods and services 
that were never delivered or performed in both case studies (Department of Defense 
General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Principle 16 (conducts ongoing and/or separate evaluations), which is 
associated with the monitoring activities component, was lacking in both case studies.  
The organizations failed to build into the procurement process a systematic and 
standardized ongoing evaluation in determining whether the employees were complying 
with the procurement and ethical policies and rules.  The separate evaluations, which 
were supposedly conducted by the auditors or governance department when the ongoing 
evaluations were not effective (Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO), 1992), were also not implemented effectively.  This was based on 
the fact that the damages involved in both cases were in the thousands and millions of 
dollars, respectively, and that multiple contracts were involved in both cases, which 
indicates that the fraudulent acts were most probably discovered years later.  The 
ineffectiveness of separate evaluations increased fraud vulnerabilities in the contract 
administration phase. 
b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal control in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for (a) the PM (in case study 3) to collude with 
contractors to commit a need recognition scheme and a shell company scheme; and (b) 
the First Lieutenant (in case study 4) to collude with contractors to commit a need 
recognition scheme.  Using a need recognition scheme, the PM and the First Lieutenant 
identified “additional goods or services” that were not necessary and not performed or 
delivered.  The payment for these “additional goods or services” was split among the 
employees and the conspiring contractors.  Using a shell company scheme the PM set up 
a shell company account to receive payments for the falsified or inflated invoices.  In 
addition, the PM used the pass-through scheme (a sub-category of a shell company 
scheme) to re-sell generic equipment as branded products at an inflated price 
(Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
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4. Case Studies 5 to 8 
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Principles 1 and 5 (demonstrates commitment to integrity and ethical 
values and enforces accountability, respectively), which are associated with the control 
environment component, were seriously lacking in these case studies.  The fact that the 
officials who committed the fraudulent acts in these case studies were senior executive or 
officials, such as contracting officers, a lieutenant colonel and high-ranking U.S. Army 
officers with approval and decision-making authorities vested in them, illustrated the 
poor moral tone set at the top management.  According to the ACFE (2013), employees 
who commit procurement fraud tend to be those who have authority in the procurement 
bidding process.  Currently, if a fraudulent act is committed by senior officials, they will 
be subject to punishment (e.g., fine or sentence to serve jail term or both).  Despite these 
punishments, these senior officials continued to engage in misconduct, and this served to 
show that the punishments were not sufficient to deter their fraudulent ways.  These 
control weaknesses increased fraud vulnerability throughout the procurement process. 
Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in these case studies.  The organizations failed to 
adopt the mandatory job rotation policy for employees holding corruption prone 
positions.  For example, in these case studies, the senior officials abused their authority to 
override existing internal controls to steer contracts to conspiring companies.  Mandatory 
job rotation will help prevent collusion between people who have the same motive to 
commit fraud (Giles, 2012).  The lack of this control activity resulted in fraud 
vulnerability in the procurement planning, solicitation planning, and source selection 
phases. 
Principle 16 (conducts ongoing and/or separate evaluations), which is 
associated with the monitoring activities component, was also lacking in these case 
studies.  Considering that the fraudsters in these case studies were senior officials, it 
would be a challenge to establish an effective ongoing evaluation procedure in the 
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procurement process.  The organizations did not have sufficient controls and did not take 
proper care to design controls for providing reasonable assurance of compliance by these 
senior officials.  This control weakness increased the risk of corrupt practices throughout 
the procurement process. 
b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal controls in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for the senior officials in the case studies to collude 
with contractors to commit fraud schemes such as bid tailoring and bid manipulation.  In 
three case studies (i.e., case studies 5, 6, and 7), the contracting officers with authority to 
oversee the procurement bidding and source-selection processes most probably used bid 
manipulation schemes to leak pertinent information, such as requirement and evaluation 
criteria, to conspiring contractors or influenced the source selection decision-making 
process.  Such pertinent information gave unfair advantages to the conspiring contractors 
and ensured that they would win the contracts. As for case study 8, the senior Army 
officers, often with authority in determining the requirement and significant influence 
over the source selection decision-making process, most probably used a bid tailoring 
scheme, such as drafting narrow specifications to accommodate the conspiring 
contractors’ capability, and a bid manipulation scheme, such as disclosing pertinent 
information including evaluation criteria to the conspiring contractors, to ensure that the 
conspiring contractors would win the contracts.  These contracting officers and senior 
Army officers, vested with decision-making and approval authorities, were able to abuse 
their authority to override existing controls to steer contracts to the conspiring 
contractors. 
5. Case Studies 9 to 15 
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Similar to case studies 5 to 8, Principles 1 and 5 (demonstrates 
commitment to integrity and ethical values and enforces accountability, respectively), 
which are associated with the control environment component, were seriously lacking in 
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case studies 9 to 15.  The fact that the officials who committed the fraudulent acts in 
these case studies were senior officials (such as contracting officers, a program director, 
and an Army Colonel) illustrated the poor moral tone set at the top management.  In 
addition, despite the disciplinary measures for purposeful wrongdoing, these senior 
officials continued to commit fraudulent activities, and this served to show that the 
punishment was not sufficient to deter their fraudulent ways.  These control weakness 
increased the risk of corrupt practices throughout the procurement process. 
Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in these case studies.  The organizations failed to 
adopt the mandatory job rotation policy for employees holding corruption prone 
positions.  For example, in these case studies the contracting officers, a program director 
and the Army colonel abused their authority to override existing internal controls to 
direct contracts to conspiring companies.  Specifically, in case study 13, the Army 
colonel, who was authorized with official duties such as supervising solicitation, award 
and oversight of contracts in Korea, abused his authority to overrule the decision of 
technical experts to award a contract to a contractor that was assessed as capable of 
providing the best value, and instead recommended that the contract be awarded to his 
future potential employer (Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013).  
Mandatory job rotation will help prevent collusion between people who have the same 
motive to commit fraud (Giles, 2012).  The lack of this control activity increased fraud 
vulnerability in the procurement planning, solicitation planning, and source selection 
phases. 
Principle 16 (conducts ongoing and/or separate evaluations), which is 
associated with the monitoring activities component, was lacking in these case studies.  
Similar to case studies 5 to 8, considering that the fraudsters in these case studies were 
senior officials, it would be a challenge to establish effective ongoing evaluation 
procedures in these case studies.  The organizations did not have sufficient controls and 
did not properly design controls to provide for reasonable assurance of compliance by 
these senior officers.  As a result, this control weakness increased the risk of corrupt 
practices throughout the procurement process. 
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b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal controls in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for the senior officials in the case studies to collude 
with contractors to commit fraud schemes such as conflict of interest, a need recognition 
scheme, bid tailoring, bid manipulation, and an unjustified sole-source award scheme.  In 
all of the seven case studies (case study 9 to 15), a conflict of interest occurred as the 
senior officials had intrinsic incentives, such as future employment or other personal 
benefits to themselves or their families, to give favorable treatment to the conspiring 
contractors.  In combination with other fraud schemes, such as bid tailoring, bid 
manipulation, and an unjustified sole-source award scheme, these senior officials who 
were vested with decision-making and approval authority were able to abuse their 
authority to override existing controls to steer contracts to the conspiring contractors.  For 
example, the program director (in case study 9), with oversight authority in determining 
the requirement and development of technical specifications as well as significant 
influence over the source selection decision-making process, most probably used bid 
tailoring schemes, such as drafting narrow specifications to accommodate the conspiring 
contractors’ capability, and bid manipulation schemes, such as providing evaluation 
criteria or setting evaluation criteria in a manner that gave an unfair advantage to the 
conspiring contractors, so as to ensure that the conspiring contractors would win the 
contracts. 
For case study 10, the former senior Air Force official, who was a 
contracting officer and vested with oversight authority of the solicitation process and 
purchase approval authority, would have used a combination of fraud schemes such as a 
need recognition scheme and unjustified sole-source award scheme to steer the contracts 
to the conspiring contractors.  For example, using a need recognition scheme and an 
unjustified sole-source award scheme, the former senior Air Force official might have 
promoted the idea of leasing tanker planes (even when the current fleet of KC-135s had 
plenty of life span left), and thereafter perhaps sought an exemption to the Competition in 
Contracting Act (CICA) to justify an “unjustified” sole-source contract to Boeing.  A 
contracting officer is vested with a vast amount of power in deciding on sole-source 
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procurement (Lansing, Burkard, 1991).  As for case studies 11 to 15, the contracting 
officers and the Army colonel, vested with oversight authority of the solicitation process 
and purchase approval authority, most probably used bid manipulation, such as providing 
confidential or pertinent information to conspiring contractors, to steer contracts to the 
conspiring contractors. 
6. Case Study 16 (Special Operations Command Bribery Scandal Nabs 
Two Retired Officers) 
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in this case study.  There was a lack of a “checks and 
balances” system in the solicitation planning and source selection phase.  In this case 
study, when Special Operations Command (SOCOM) signed the contract to delegate the 
evaluation of proposals function, which is considered as an inherently government-like 
function, to the retired Army lieutenant colonel, SOCOM would have most probably 
continued to maintain the responsibility for the success of the program and its 
responsibility to manage the contractor.  However, despite retaining the final decision 
authority, SOCOM failed to provide adequate management and technical checks or 
oversight of the contractor.  For example, the inadequate checks or oversight by SOCOM 
resulted in the first official (i.e., the SOCOM contractor to evaluate bid proposals) to 
abuse his position of power to give favorable review of proposals submitted by those 
conspiring contractors (Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013).  The 
first official, who was responsible for evaluating bid proposals, would have had 
significant influence over the development of evaluation criteria during the solicitation 
planning phase.  The lack of adequate oversight by SOCOM might have caused the 
evaluation criteria to be established in a manner that gave unfair advantages to the 
conspiring contractors. 
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b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal controls in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for the first official to collude with the second official 
to commit the bid manipulation scheme.  For example, and as previously mentioned, the 
first official might have attempted to influence the source selection process by tailoring 
the evaluation criteria to accommodate the conspiring companies’ capability or create 
highly subjective or unbalanced evaluation criteria so that he could manipulate the bid 
scores during the source-selection phase. 
7. Case Study 17 (Awarding Contracts to Spouse Earns Couple One 
Year in Prison) 
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in this case study.  The organizations failed to adopt 
some common control activities such as segregation of duties, mandatory job rotation, or 
vacation for employees holding corruption prone positions.  For example, in this case, 
besides being given the responsibility to determine the training needs, the employee was 
most probably given the authority to approve the contract award, to issue contracts for the 
training services as well as the authority to certify the completion of training services.  In 
this case, the employee had total control of the purchase, and this was a violation of the 
segregation of duties rule.  This control weakness increased fraud vulnerability in the 
procurement planning, source selection, and contract administration procurement phases. 
Principle 16 (conducts ongoing and/or separate evaluations), which is 
associated with the monitoring activities component, was lacking in this case study.  The 
organization failed to build into the procurement process a systematic standardized 
ongoing evaluation in determining whether the employees are complying with the 
procurement and ethical policies and rules.  The separate evaluations, which were 
supposedly to be conducted by the auditors or governance department when the ongoing 
evaluations were not effective (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013), were also not implemented 
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effectively based on the fact that the fraudulent acts were discovered two years later.  The 
ineffectiveness of separate evaluations increased fraud vulnerabilities in the contract 
administration process. 
b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal controls in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for the Department of the Treasury (DOT) employee 
to commit fraud schemes such as conflict of interest, bid tailoring, and bid manipulation.  
A conflict of interest occurred as the employee had intrinsic incentives or interest to favor 
her husband’s company.  In view of this and in order to steer training service contracts to 
her husband’s company, the employee most probably used bid tailoring and bid 
manipulation schemes.  Under bid tailoring, the employee could have, when determining 
the training needs, drafted a narrow specification that accommodated her husband’s 
company capability so as to disqualify other competitors.  At the same time, using bid 
manipulation, the employee would have leaked pertinent information to her husband in 
advance so that he had adequate time to prepare a comprehensive bid. 
8. Case Study 18 (Marine Corps Say Goodbye to Officers who Schemed 
with Thai Vendors) 
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Principle 1 (demonstrates commitment to integrity and ethical values), 
which is associated with the control environment component, was lacking in this case 
study.  The tone at the top depicting the importance of integrity and ethical values seemed 
to be lacking in the organization based on the fact that the fraud scheme involved three 
officers within the same organization.  Besides the poor morals set at the top 
management, the behavior of co-workers can also influence employee’s ethical conduct.  
In this case, the other co-workers, after observing their colleague engaging in 
misconduct, would be more likely to commit fraudulent acts or collude with him.  This 
control weakness increased the risk of corrupt practices throughout the procurement 
process. 
63 
Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in this case study.  First, the organization had failed to 
adopt mandatory job rotation or vacation for employees holding corruption prone 
positions.  Without a mandatory job rotation or vacation rule in place, it created the 
opportunity, time and space for people who have the same motive to collude and commit 
fraud (Giles, 2012).  This control weakness increased the fraud vulnerability in the 
procurement planning and solicitation planning phases.  For example, the officers most 
probably leaked pertinent information, such as requirement, program budget, and 
evaluation criteria, to the Thai vendor to defeat competition.  Second, there was a lack of 
a “checks and balances” system in the contract administration phase.  For example, the 
lack of independent checks of services or goods acceptance and invoices submitted by the 
Thai vendor resulted in the payments of goods and services that were not delivered or 
performed. 
Principle 16 (conducts ongoing and/or separate evaluations) of the 
monitoring activities component was lacking throughout the procurement process.  
Similar to the other case studies, the organization had failed to build into the procurement 
process a systematic and standardized ongoing evaluation in determining whether the 
employees were complying with the procurement and ethical policies and rules.  The lack 
of effective ongoing evaluations and the absence of management review caused the 
fraudulent activities to proliferate throughout the procurement process. 
b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal controls in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for the three Marine Corps officers to collude with the 
Thai contractor to commit fraud schemes such as bid manipulation.  For example, using a 
bid manipulation scheme, the first two officers leaked pertinent information, such as 
program allocated budget, incumbent contractor’s price, evaluation criteria, etc., to the 
Thai contractor so that it could inflate its bid and still outbid the other competitors 
(Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013).  A part of the scheme involved  
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the third officer, who had vested authority to accept goods and services, to abuse his 
authority as a receiving officer to accept incomplete goods that were delivered by the 
Thai contractor. 
9. Case Study 19 (Friends in Low Places) 
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Principle 4 (demonstrates commitment to competence), which is 
associated with the control environment component, was lacking throughout the 
procurement process.  The organization had not demonstrated a strong commitment to 
develop and retain competent and ethical procurement employees.  In this case, based on 
the fact that the U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) officers planned to defraud the 
government immediately after their retirement when they were still in service, showed 
that the organization lacked a commitment to attract, develop, and retain competent and 
ethical employees.  Employees often commit wrong doings in a work environment where 
they feel discouraged or feel no loyalty towards the organization.  In addition, based on 
the fact that no staff reported any misconduct when the second officer bid on the contract 
for the requirement that he had created prior to his retirement, indicated that the 
organization had failed to put in place a training policy for the procurement staff on fraud 
awareness, prevention, and detection training so as to prepare them when they detect any 
misconduct or when they are faced with ethical dilemmas. 
Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities, and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in this case study.  First, there was a lack of regular 
training for procurement staff on fraud awareness and ethical code of conduct.  Next, 
there was a lack of a “checks and balances” system in the procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, and source selection phases.  For example, in this case, the lack of 
independent checks of the technical specification, evaluation criteria and evaluation 
report had created the opportunity for the two DOI officers, who were involved in the 
development of specification, evaluation criteria and the source selection decision-
making process, to steer the contracts to the conspiring company. 
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b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal control in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for the two former DOI officers to collude and commit 
fraud schemes such as conflict of interest, bid manipulation and bid tailoring schemes.  
For example, in this case the first officer’s future employer was engaged by the second 
officer as a sub-contractor to bid on a contract.  A conflict of interest occurred as the first 
officer, who had the authority to influence the source selection decision-making process, 
had a personal interest (such as a better remuneration package from his future employer) 
to give favorable reviews of the second officer’s proposal.  Using a bid manipulation 
scheme, the first officer, who was also responsible for creating the evaluation criteria, 
might have leaked pertinent information, such as evaluation criteria, to the second officer 
or might have established the evaluation criteria in such a manner that gave an unfair 
advantage to the second officer’s company during the source selection process.  Using the 
bid tailoring scheme, the second officer, when creating the requirement for the 
solicitation while still in service, could have drafted the specification in such a manner 
that gave an unfair advantage to him when he bid on the contract immediately upon his 
retirement. 
10. Case Study 20 (Patrick Air Force Base Engineer Violates Conflict of 
Interest Statute) 
a. Internal Control Weakness in the Procurement Process 
Principle 1 (demonstrates commitment to integrity and ethical values), 
which is associated with the control environment component, was lacking throughout the 
procurement process.  The tone set by the management of the organization on the 
importance of internal control, which included the expected ethical behavior for all staff, 
was poor.  The fact that the fraud scheme involved numerous government officials within 
the same organization indicated that the ethical tone at the top was poor. 
Principles 10 and 12 (selects and develops control activities, and deploys 
through policies and procedures, respectively), which are associated with the control 
activities component, were lacking in this case study.  First, there was a lack of regular 
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training for procurement staff on ethical code of conduct.  Second, the organization failed 
to adopt mandatory job rotation for employees holding corruption prone positions.  
Mandatory job rotation will help prevent collusion between people who have the same 
motive to commit fraud (Giles, 2012).  Third, there was a lack of a “checks and balances” 
system in the procurement planning, solicitation planning and source selection phases.  
For example, in this case the lack of independent checks of the technical specification, 
evaluation criteria and evaluation report created the opportunity for the Air Force 
engineer, who was involved in the development of the technical documents and the 
source selection decision-making process, to steer contracts to his own company.  The 
lack of these control activities increased fraud vulnerability in the procurement planning, 
solicitation planning and source selection phases. 
Principle 16 (conducts ongoing and/or separate evaluations), which is 
associated with the monitoring activities component, was lacking throughout the 
procurement process.  Similar to the other case studies, the organization failed to build 
into the procurement process a systematic and standardized ongoing evaluation in 
determining whether the employees were complying with the procurement and ethical 
policies and rules.  The lack of effective ongoing evaluations and the absence of 
management review caused the fraudulent activities to proliferate throughout the 
procurement process. 
b. Type of Fraud Scheme Used 
The lack of internal controls in the procurement process as previously 
mentioned created the opportunity for the Air Force base engineer, together with 
numerous government employees, to commit fraud schemes such as conflict of interest, 
bid tailoring, and bid manipulation schemes.  In this case, a conflict of interest occurred 
as the Air Force engineer and other government employees had personal interests to give 
favorable reviews of their company’s proposal.  Using a bid tailoring scheme, the base 
engineer, who was involved in the drafting of technical specifications, could have drafted 
the specification to tailor to accommodate his company’s capability.  Using a bid 
manipulation scheme, the Air Force engineer could have influenced the source selection 
process by setting the evaluation criteria in a manner that gave an unfair advantage to his 
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own company. For example, the engineer could have created highly subjective or 
unbalanced evaluation criteria so that he could manipulate the bid scores during the 
source selection phase. 
Through the analysis of the 20 case studies, Appendix E summarizes for 
each case study, the procurement processes that are vulnerable to fraud, the weaknesses 
of internal control components, including its associated principles, and the type of fraud 
scheme used.  Table 2 provides a summary of the analysis.  From the analysis of the 20 
case studies, source selection and contract administration procurement phases were found 
to be most vulnerable to fraud.  In terms of internal control weaknesses, organizations in 
the 20 case studies typically lack control in three the internal control components, namely 
the control environment, control activities and monitoring activities.  In addition, conflict 
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Table 2.   A Summary of the Case Studies Analysis. 
As previously mentioned, the analysis of the 20 case studies suggested that 
the organizations studied typically lacked control in three internal control components, 
namely control environment, control activities and monitoring activities.  In terms of 
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control environment, the organizations in the case studies were vulnerable to fraud or 
abuse or mismanagement because these organizations (a) lacked a high ethical tone at the 
top; and (b) failed to demonstrate a commitment to develop and maintain a competent, 
professional, and ethical procurement workforce.  In terms of control activities, there 
were weaknesses in key control activities to provide reasonable assurance that the 
organizations’ internal control decisions were followed.  The key procurement control 
activities that were lacking include mandating regular anti-fraud and ethics training to 
employees holding corruption prone positions, implementing segregation of duties, 
mandating job rotation or vacation for employees holding corruption prone positions, and 
setting up a “checks and balances" system in the procurement planning, solicitation 
planning, source selection, and contract administration phases.  In terms of monitoring 
activities, the organizations lacked effective ongoing and separate evaluation procedures.  
The organizations in the case studies failed to incorporate into the procurement process a 
systematic and standardized approach for assessing whether the employees were carrying 
out their duties in compliance with the procurement and ethical policies and rules. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed and analyzed 20 case studies of actual fraud incidents and 
discussed the weakness of internal controls that led to the fraudulent activities.  The next 
chapter analyzes and provides recommendations for improvements in each of the case 
studies by applying the relevant internal controls into its procurement process to deter 
procurement fraud. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, recommendations for improvements are identified from the 
analysis in each of the 20 case studies of fraud incidents.  Specifically, for each case 
study this chapter provides recommended improvements by applying the relevant internal 
controls in the procurement process to deter procurement fraud.  These recommendations 
serve to provide guidelines for other government organizations to develop and design an 
effective internal control system to deter fraud. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Case Study 1 (Navy Bribery Scheme) 
The key internal control improvements recommended in the procurement 
processes for the U.S. Navy to deter procurement fraud are as follows: 
a. Control Environment  
Maintain and enhance an ethical tone at the top and a culture of 
honesty throughout the procurement process and establish effective organizational 
structures for managing decentralized procurement.  Top management cannot just 
talk about acting ethically but needs to lead by example and actions, which will improve 
loyalty and staff morale.  For example, talking about commitment to combat fraudulent 
acts but not deploying resources to oversee the execution of decentralized procurement 
activities is an indication of not “walking the talk.”  Thus, the organization must establish 
an effective organizational structure for managing decentralized procurement.  Adequate 
and competent resources must be deployed to oversee the proper execution of the 
delegation by its decentralized procurement activities at the center (Committee of 
Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 1992; COSO, 2013). 
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Set challenging but realistic and achievable goals. Procurement 
performance goals should be regularly reviewed to ensure that they are realistic and 
achievable (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
Reward integrity.  While sufficient punishment for procurement fraud is 
essential for an effective control environment, rewarding staff for ethical behavior is also 
a critical element in fraud prevention.  To encourage ethical behavior, the organization 
should not reward procurement staff only for meeting procurement performance goals; 
staff should also be rewarded for acting ethically and with integrity (Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), 2013). 
b. Risk Assessment 
Conduct detailed risk analysis and adopt proactive risk management 
methods for a decentralized procurement structure.  As previously mentioned, the 
risk of fraud occurring in a decentralized procurement structure is often higher compared 
to a centralized procurement structure.  Therefore, effective management oversight 
requires that detailed risk analysis and management be carried out regularly for a 
decentralized procurement structure taking into account the organization’s vulnerabilities 
and the impact decentralized procurement can have on achieving an effective internal 
control system.  In this case, having identified that consistent and efficient practices and 
policies are difficult to enforce in a decentralized procurement structure, the U.S. Navy 
must establish a relationship with the oversight group, such as DCAA or Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA), for them to carry out a mandatory audit.  
Effective risk management process may include implementing proactive audit procedures 
such as a surprise audit, where possible, to demonstrate the organization’s commitment to 
aggressively and proactively deter fraudulent activities instead of waiting for fraud cases 
to be brought to their attention.  Another effective risk management approach is to 
analyze procurement trends or payment patterns to see whether there is any correlation 
between the winning contractor and a specific purchasing agent (COSO, 1992; COSO, 
2013). 
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c. Control Activities 
Adopt the segregation of duties rule.  No single procurement staff 
member should have the authority to write a statement of work, initiate request for 
proposals, evaluate bids, approve award of purchases and issue contracts or orders to the 
contractor, perform acceptance of goods and services and make payment to the 
contractor.  In this case, the U.S. Navy former civilian employee who wrote the statement 
of work should not have been allowed to approve the award of the purchase.  It is 
essential that periodic reviews be conducted to ensure that there are independent checks 
for proper segregation of duties. When segregation of duties is properly enforced, it will 
create accountability among employees who are responsible for the specific areas of the 
procurement cycle and will also help minimize collusion.  Although, in this case, the 
fraudulent acts may still have occurred even with segregation of duties since the scheme 
was colluded from the line workers to the supervisor level.  Segregation of duties is 
essential to fraud prevention as it requires collusion among people, and as the number of 
people involved in a fraud incident increases, the likelihood of detection is increased.  
Therefore, for more effective control, segregation of duties must be implemented in 
conjunction with mandatory job rotation. Skipping either control will reduce the 
effectiveness of the other control.  When the segregation of duties rule is enforced in 
conjunction with the mandatory job rotation rule, it limits the fraudsters’ opportunity to 
commit fraud as segregation of duties requires collusion with two or more like-minded 
people to commit a fraudulent act (ACFE, 2013). 
Introduce mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees holding 
corruption prone positions.  As some fraud requires manual intervention by the 
fraudsters themselves, the enforcement of mandatory job rotation or vacations among the 
employees with corruption prone positions will help in fraud prevention.  The 
enforcement of mandatory job rotation is especially essential to prevent employees 
holding corruption prone positions from abusing their authority to override existing 
internal controls.  Mandatory job rotation will reduce collusion between like-minded 
people.  For example, on 1 October 2013, the Public Service Department of the 
Singapore Government announced that mandated job rotation and leave will be required 
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for officers holding positions that are “more susceptible to being suborned and 
exploited,” and the policy will be effective beginning in 2014.  Officers holding 
corruption prone positions will not be allowed to serve in the same position for more than 
five years (Ng, 2013). 
Enforce compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for employees 
holding corruption prone positions.  It must be made mandatory for staff members 
holding corruption prone positions (including top-level management) to receive regular 
anti-fraud training, including fraud awareness, prevention and detection, as well as ethics 
training.  The training scope must cover the organization’s position on corporate 
compliance, its code of ethical conduct, the staff’s roles and responsibilities in the system 
of internal control, which includes the responsibility to report misconduct in the 
organization, the organization’s reporting mechanism, procurement fraud awareness, 
including awareness of potential red flags and identification of common red flags.  This 
training should be conducted regularly, at least once a year.  Such training, when 
conducted on a regular basis, is essential to fraud prevention as it strengthens and 
reinforces the staff’s personal integrity and prepares them when faced with ethical 
dilemmas (ACFE, 2013). 
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the procurement 
planning, source selection and contract administration phases.  During the 
procurement planning phase, specifications or a statement of work must be independently 
checked by a supervisor of the author of the documents or procurement personnel to 
ensure that they are clear in defining what is needed, consistent with other similar 
specifications, unbiased and do not favor any particular company.  During the source 
selection phase, the contract must be independently checked by the Head of Contracting 
Activity before release to ensure that there is no vague contract language.  During the 
contract administration phase, often documents such as delivery orders or service reports 
endorsed by the Goods/Services Receiving Officer are used as evidence of receiving 
goods and services.  An effective system of “checks and balances” requires delivery 
orders or service reports to be independently verified and checked by a supervisor 
independent of the purchasing process of those particular goods and/or services. In 
particular, where services are performed and delivered, the system requires an 
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independent check of work being done by a contracting officer of another program, 
which is essential to fraud prevention.  The system of “checks and balances” will limit 
the power of others to commit fraud and help reduce fraudulent activities. 
d. Monitoring Activities 
Establish effective evaluations in the procurement process.  Build into 
the procurement process, effective ongoing evaluation procedures to determine whether 
the system of internal control is implemented and functioning properly.  Since ongoing 
evaluations may be rendered ineffective when co-workers collude among themselves, 
separate evaluations that are conducted by auditors or governing departments, such as 
DCMA, must be made mandatory.  Separate evaluations must also be conducted 
regularly regardless of whether the ongoing evaluations are deemed effective or not as 
the perceived effectiveness of ongoing evaluations may just be a false impression given 
by the colluding employees (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
2. Case Study 2 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Fraud Case) 
The key internal control improvements recommended in the procurement 
processes for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to deter procurement fraud are as 
follows:  
a. Control Environment 
Maintain and enhance an ethical tone at the top and a culture of 
honesty within the organization.  Both the behavior of management and co-workers can 
impact an employee’s ethical conduct.  When management acts ethically, employees will 
more than likely act ethically.  If employees see their co-workers acting ethically, they 
too, will be more than likely to act ethically.  Hence, the source of ethical behavior starts 
from the top and is the foundation for the organization (COSO, 1992; COSO, 2013). 
Reward integrity.  Similar to the Navy Bribery Scheme case, in addition 
to ensuring there is sufficient punishment for procurement fraud, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers must also reward staff for ethical behavior to encourage ethical behavior 
(COSO, 1992). 
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b. Control Activities 
Adopt segregation of duties and mandate job rotation or vacations for 
employees holding corruption prone positions.  Similar to the Navy Bribery Scheme, a 
segregation of duties policy must be established to ensure that no single procurement 
staff member will have the authority to write statements of work, initiate requests for 
proposals, evaluate bids, approve award of purchases, sign contracts or orders, perform 
acceptance of goods and services, and make payment to the contractor.  If the segregation 
of duties had been in place and enforced, the former program manager for the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers who issued orders for goods and services would not have been 
allowed to certify the completion of goods and services.  For more effective control, 
segregation of duties must be implemented in conjunction with mandatory job rotation or 
vacations for employees holding corruption prone positions. 
Enforce compulsory fraud awareness and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions.  Similar to the Navy Bribery Scheme, it 
must be made mandatory for staff members holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, to receive anti-fraud and ethics training on a regular basis, 
preferably on an annual basis.   
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the source selection 
phase.  During the source selection phase, prices or bids from contractors and sub-
contractors must be independently checked by a contracting officer or price analyst of 
another program to ensure that no falsified or inflated costs or prices are used.  The 
system of “checks and balances” will help limit the power of others to commit fraud and 
help reduce fraudulent activities. 
c. Monitoring Activities 
Establish effective evaluations in the procurement process.  Similar to 
the Navy Bribery Scheme case, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers must build effective 
ongoing evaluation procedures into the procurement process.  Likewise, separate 
evaluations must be made mandatory regardless of the effectiveness of the ongoing 
evaluations. 
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3. Case Study 3 (Bribery and Fraud Lands Program Manager in Jail) & 
Case Study 4 (Misconduct of a First Lieutenant) 
The key internal control improvements recommended in the procurement 
processes for the organizations to deter procurement fraud are as follows: 
a. Control Activities 
Adopt a segregation of duties policy and mandate job rotation or 
vacations.  Similar to the earlier case studies, a system of “checks and balances” must be 
established to ensure that no single procurement staff member will have total control of 
the purchase.  With the segregation of duties rule established and enforced, the PM (in 
case study 3) and the First Lieutenant (in case study 4) would not have had total control 
of the purchase as their power would have been limited.  As previously mentioned, 
segregation of duties must be implemented in conjunction with mandatory job rotation or 
vacations for employees holding corruption prone positions to ensure more effective 
controls. 
Enforce compulsory fraud awareness and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions.  Similar to the earlier case studies, it 
must be made mandatory for staff members holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, to receive fraud awareness (types of frauds and its red flags) and 
ethics training on a regular basis, preferably on an annual basis.   
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the source selection 
and contract administration phases.  Similar to case study 1, a system of “checks and 
balances” must be established so that the contractor’s price or quotation and delivery 
orders or service reports are independently checked and verified by a supervisor 
independent of the purchasing process of that particular goods and/or services contract. 
The system of “checks and balances” will limit the power of others to commit fraud and 
help reduce fraudulent activities. 
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b. Monitoring Activities 
Establish effective evaluations in the procurement process.  Similar to 
the earlier case studies, the organizations must build effective ongoing evaluation 
procedures into the procurement process.  Likewise, separate evaluations must be made 
mandatory regardless of the effectiveness of the ongoing evaluations. 
4. Case Studies 5 to 15 
As the officials committing fraudulent acts in case studies 5 to 15 were senior 
officers, the key internal control improvements recommended in the procurement 
processes were also similar.  The internal control improvements recommended for the 
organizations in these case studies to deter procurement fraud are as follows:  
a. Control Environment 
Maintain and enhance an ethical tone at the top and a culture of 
honesty.  Both the behavior of management and co-workers can impact an employee’s 
ethical conduct.  When management acts ethically, employees will more than likely act 
ethically. If employees see their co-workers acting ethically, they will more than likely 
also act ethically.  Hence, the source of ethical behavior starts from the top and is the 
foundation for the organization. 
Enhance enforce accountability.  If contracting officers or senior 
officials commit a fraudulent act, tougher punishment must be enforced. There is another 
Chinese saying that “people who make the law, but break the law, have committed a 
more serious crime,” which refers to a situation in which people with authority who break 
the rules should be subject to a tougher punishment.  Often, people will not be deterred 
from their fraudulent ways until they understand that they will be held to a higher 
standard and punished more severely (Lansing, Burkard, 1991). 
b. Control Activities 
Introduce mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees holding 
corruption prone positions.  Segregation of duties alone is not effective at deterring 
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fraud committed by senior officials, as these individuals are often uniquely positioned to 
override even the best-designed control measures.  As previously mentioned in case study 
1, the implementation of the segregation of duties and the enforcement of mandatory job 
rotation are essential to prevent employees who hold corruption prone positions from 
abusing their authority to override existing internal controls.  Mandatory job rotation will 
help prevent collusion between people who have the same motive to commit fraud (Giles, 
2012). 
Enforce compulsory fraud awareness and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions.  Similar to the earlier case studies, it 
must be made mandatory for staff members holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, to receive anti-fraud and ethics training on a regular basis, 
preferably on an annual basis.  Such training, conducted on a regular basis, is essential to 
fraud prevention as it strengthens and reinforces the staff’s personal integrity and 
prepares them when faced with ethical dilemmas. 
Enhance existing whistleblower system.  Considering that the officials 
committing fraud in these case studies were top-level officials, tips from whistleblowers 
become an effective fraud detection method.  A whistleblower is a person who reports 
suspected dishonest activities or misconduct taking place in government agencies or 
private organizations (ACFE, 2013).  Although some people are comfortable with 
reporting unethical or illegal acts openly, many are not. To encourage staff to report 
misconduct without fear of being retaliated against by management or co-workers, 
organizations must ensure that the whistleblower hotline, with dedicated phone numbers, 
is independent so that the whistleblower’s identity can remain anonymous.  In addition, 
the existence of the whistleblower system has to be made known to all employees, 
contractors, the general public and other stakeholders. 
c. Monitoring Activities 
Establish effective evaluations in the procurement process.  As 
previously mentioned, considering that the fraudsters in these case studies were senior 
officials, ongoing evaluations may not be as effective.  Thus, it is critical that separate 
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evaluations by auditors or governing departments be made mandatory regardless of the 
effectiveness of ongoing evaluations.  It is also essential that auditors or governing 
departments be vigilant in reviewing transactions involving senior officials. 
5. Case Study 16 (Special Operations Command Bribery Scandal Nabs 
Two Retired Officers) 
The key internal control improvements recommended in the procurement 
processes for SOCOM to deter procurement fraud are as follows:  
a. Control Activities 
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the solicitation 
planning phase to provide adequate review of the evaluation criteria.  An adequate 
review of the evaluation criteria is essential for ensuring that the evaluation criteria 
include “key areas of importance and “emphasis” to be considered during the source 
selection phase, and that they can be objectively measured. 
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the source selection phase to 
provide adequate checks of the evaluation process and oversight of the contractor.  
Evaluation or technical review reports of the proposals must be checked to ensure that 
they are objectively evaluated solely based on the pre-determined evaluation criteria and 
procurement method. 
6. Case Study 17 (Awarding Contracts to Spouse Earns Couple One 
Year in Prison) 
The key internal control improvements recommended in the procurement 
processes for the Department of the Treasury (DOT) to deter procurement fraud are as 
follows:  
a. Control Activities 
Adopt the segregation of duties rule and mandate job rotation or 
vacation.  Similar to the earlier case studies, a system of “checks and balances” must be 
established to ensure that no single procurement staff member has total control of the 
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purchase.  If segregation of duties were enforced, the DOT employee would not have had 
total control of the purchase.  As previously mentioned, segregation of duties must be 
implemented in conjunction with mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees 
holding corruption prone positions to ensure more effective controls. 
Enforce compulsory fraud awareness and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions.  Similar to the earlier case studies, it 
must be made mandatory for staff members holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, to receive fraud awareness (types of fraud and its red flags) and 
ethics training on a regular basis, preferably on an annual basis.   
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the procurement 
planning, source selection, and contract administration phases.  Similar to case study 
1, a system of “checks and balances” must be established so that the technical 
specifications, contractor’s price or quotation and delivery orders or service reports are 
independently checked and verified by a supervisor independent of the purchasing 
process of that particular goods and/or services contract. The system of “checks and 
balances” will limit the power of others to commit fraud and help reduce fraudulent 
activities. 
b. Monitoring Activities 
Establish effective evaluations in the procurement process.  Similar to 
the earlier case studies, the organizations must build effective ongoing evaluation 
procedures into the procurement process.  Likewise, separate evaluations must be made 
mandatory regardless of the effectiveness of the ongoing evaluations. 
7. Case Study 18 (Marine Corps Say Goodbye to Officers who Schemed 
with Thai Vendors) 
The key internal control improvements recommended in the procurement 
processes for the U.S. Marine Corps to deter procurement fraud are as follows:  
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a. Control Environment 
Maintain and enhance an ethical tone at the top and a culture of 
honesty.  As previously mentioned, the behavior of both management and co-workers 
can impact an employee’s ethical conduct.  When management acts ethically, employees 
will more than likely act ethically.  If employees see their co-workers acting ethically, 
they will be more than likely to act ethically as well.  Hence, the source of ethical 
behavior starts from the top and is the foundation for the organization. 
Reward integrity.  Similar to the Navy Bribery Scheme case, in addition 
to ensuring there is sufficient punishment for procurement fraud, the U.S. Marine Corps 
must also reward staff for ethical behavior to encourage ethical behavior. 
b. Control Activities 
Adopt the segregation of duties rule and mandate job rotation or 
vacations.  Similar to case study 1, implementing the segregation of duties alone is not 
adequate as shown in this case study.  Segregation of duties will become ineffective when 
employees holding different authorizations collude.  Therefore, besides establishing 
segregation of duties to ensure that no single staff member will have total control of the 
purchase, mandatory job rotation or vacations must be implemented simultaneously for 
more effective control. 
Enforce compulsory fraud awareness and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions.  Similar to the earlier cases, it must be 
made mandatory for staff holding corruption prone positions, including top-level 
management, to receive anti-fraud and ethics training on a regular basis, preferably on an 
annual basis. 
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the contract 
administration phase.  A system of “checks and balances” must be established so that 
delivery orders or service reports are independently checked and verified by a supervisor 
independent of the purchasing process of that particular goods and/or services contract. 
The system of “checks and balances” will help limit the power of others to commit fraud 
and help reduce fraudulent activities. 
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c. Monitoring Activities 
Establish effective evaluations in the procurement process.  Similar to 
the earlier case studies, the U.S. Marine Corps must build effective ongoing evaluation 
procedures into the procurement process.  Likewise, separate evaluations must be made 
mandatory regardless of the effectiveness of the ongoing evaluations. 
8. Case Study 19 (Friends in Low Places) 
The key internal control improvements recommended in the procurement 
processes for the Department of the Interior (DOI) to deter procurement fraud are as 
follows:  
a. Control Environment 
Maintain and enhance an ethical tone at the top and a culture of 
honesty.  Both the behavior of management and co-workers can impact an employee’s 
ethical conduct.  When management acts ethically, employees will more than likely act 
ethically.  If employees see their co-workers acting ethically, they will more than likely 
act ethically as well.  Hence, the source of ethical behavior starts from the top and is the 
foundation for the organization. 
Establish or enhance existing training policies on anti-fraud, including 
fraud awareness, prevention, detection and fraud management, and ethical 
behavior.  Such anti-fraud training will equip the procurement staff with the basic skills 
to detect and manage potential fraud when they see possible fraudulent activities.  Early 
anti-fraud and ethics training at the time of employment and annual refresher training are 
essential to the overall effectiveness of the internal control system.  At the time of 
employment, anti-fraud messages such as, “The Organization’s vision is to strive for zero 
fraud,” “The Organization does not tolerate fraud” and “The Organization shall take 
disciplinary action against staff members who do not abide by our policies” should be 
communicated clearly to the staff members and reinforced during the annual code of 
conduct refresher training. Staff members should also be encouraged to talk to their 
managers when they suspect that something is not right. An informed staff which is on 
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board and proactively involved in fighting fraud provides and reinforces the desired anti-
fraud culture within the organization and the necessary foundation for a fraud prevention 
program. Skipping this step reduces the effectiveness of other internal control measures 
and undermines the organization’s effort in fighting fraud.  Anti-fraud and ethics training 
are not one-time efforts.  To have an effective internal control system, regular refresher 
training (preferably on an annual basis) should be conducted for staff at all levels.  In this 
case, with the capability to detect the misconduct of the two former DOI officers, the 
procurement staff, if adequately trained, would have taken immediate and appropriate 
steps to address the fraud and would have brought the matter to management’s attention. 
b. Control Activities 
Enforce compulsory fraud awareness and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions.  Similar to the earlier cases, it must be 
made mandatory for staff members holding corruption prone positions, including top-
level management, to receive anti-fraud and ethics training on a regular basis, preferably 
on an annual basis. 
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the procurement 
planning phase to provide adequate checks of specifications or statements of work 
before release for solicitation.  Specifications or statements of work must be 
independently checked by a supervisor of the author of the document or procurement 
personnel to ensure that they are clear in defining what is needed, consistent with other 
similar specifications, unbiased and do not favor any particular company. 
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the solicitation 
planning phase to provide adequate review of the evaluation criteria.  Adequate 
review of the evaluation criteria is essential in ensuring that the evaluation criteria 
include “key areas of importance” and “emphasis” to be considered during the source 
selection phase, and that they can be objectively measured.  
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the source selection 
phase to provide adequate checks of the evaluation process.  Independent evaluation 
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or review of the proposals must be checked to ensure that they are objectively evaluated 
solely based on the pre-determined evaluation criteria and procurement method. 
c. Monitoring Activities 
Establish effective evaluations in the procurement process.  Similar to 
the earlier case studies, DOI must build effective ongoing evaluations procedures into the 
procurement process.  Likewise, separate evaluations must be made mandatory regardless 
of the effectiveness of the ongoing evaluations. 
9. Case Study 20 (Patrick Air Force Base Engineer Violates Conflict of 
Interest Statute) 
The key internal control improvements recommended in the procurement 
processes for the U.S. Air Force to deter procurement fraud are as follows:  
a. Control Environment 
Maintain and enhance an ethical tone at the top and a culture of 
honesty.  As previously mentioned, the behavior of both management and co-workers 
can impact an employee’s ethical conduct.  When management acts ethically, employees 
will more than likely act ethically.  If employees see their co-workers acting ethically, 
they will more than likely act ethically as well.  Hence, the source of ethical behavior 
starts from the top and is the foundation for the organization. 
Establish or enhance existing training policies on anti-fraud, including 
fraud awareness, prevention, detection, and fraud management, and ethical 
behavior.  Similar to case study 19, anti-fraud and ethical behavior training will equip 
the procurement staff with the basic skills needed to detect and manage potential fraud 
when they see possible fraudulent activities. 
b. Control Activities 
Mandate job rotation or vacations for employees holding corruption 
prone positions.  Once again, this case study has shown that mandatory job rotation or 
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vacations for employees holding corruption prone positions is essential to deter 
procurement fraud. 
Enforce compulsory fraud awareness and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions.  Similar to the earlier cases, it must be 
made mandatory for staff members holding corruption prone positions, including top-
level management, to receive anti-fraud and ethics training on a regular basis, preferably 
on an annual basis. 
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the procurement 
planning phase to provide adequate checks of specifications or statements of work.  
Specifications or statements of work must be independently checked by a supervisor of 
the author of the documents or procurement personnel to ensure that they are clear in 
defining what is needed, consistent with other similar specifications, unbiased and do not 
favor any particular company. 
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the solicitation 
planning phase to provide adequate review of the evaluation criteria.  Adequate 
review of the evaluation criteria is essential in ensuring that the evaluation criteria 
determined includes “key areas of importance” and “emphasis” to be considered during 
the source selection phase, and that they can be objectively measured. 
Implement a system of “checks and balances” in the source selection 
phase to provide adequate checks of the evaluation process.  Independent evaluation 
or review of bid proposals must be conducted to ensure that they are objectively 
evaluated solely based on the pre-determined evaluation criteria and procurement 
method. 
c. Monitoring Activities 
Establish effective evaluations in the procurement process.  Similar to 
the earlier case studies, the U.S. Air Force must build effective ongoing evaluation 
procedures into the procurement process.  Likewise, separate evaluations must be made 
mandatory regardless of the effectiveness of the ongoing evaluations. 
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Tables 3 to 11 provide a summary for each case study and the key internal 
control improvements recommended in the procurement processes to deter fraud. 
Case Study 1 (Navy Bribery Scheme) 
Internal Control 
Component 




• Throughout procurement process 
o Maintain an ethical environment and a culture of honesty within 
the organization  
o Establish an effective organizational structure for managing 
decentralized procurement at the U.S. Navy readiness center 
o Set challenging but realistic and achievable procurement goals 
o Establish a positive work environment 
o Reward integrity 
Risk Assessment • Throughout procurement process 
o Conduct detailed and periodic risk analysis for decentralized 
procurement structure 
• Contract Administration phase 
o Adopt proactive risk management methods such as 
 surprise audit 
 analysis of procurement trends to see whether the same 
contractor is winning a contract lead by a specific 
purchasing agent 
Control Activities • Throughout procurement process 
o Implement segregation of duties rule in conjunction with 
mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees holding 
corruption prone positions  
o Mandate compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions, including top-
level management, on a regular basis (preferably on an annual 
basis) 
• Procurement Planning phase 
o Implement a system of “checks and balances” for reviewing 
specification or statement of work before release of solicitation 
• Source Selection phase 
o Implement a system of “checks and balances” for reviewing 
contract before release of contract 
• Contract Administration phase 
o Implement a system of “checks and balances” for acceptance of 
goods and services 
Monitoring 
Activities 
• Throughout the procurement process 
o Build ongoing evaluation procedures throughout the 
procurement process 
• Contract Administration phase 
o Mandate separate evaluations (to be conducted regularly and if 
possible surprise audit) regardless of whether the ongoing 
evaluation is effective or not 
Table 3.   Summary of Key Internal Control Improvement for Case Study 1. 
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Case Study 2 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Fraud Case) 
Internal Control 
Component 




• Throughout procurement process 
o Maintain an ethical environment and a culture of honesty 
within the organization 
o Reward integrity 
Control 
Activities 
• Throughout procurement process 
o Implement segregation of duties in conjunction with 
mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees holding 
corruption prone positions 
o Mandate compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, on a regular basis (preferably on 
an annual basis) 
• Source Selection phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for 




• Throughout procurement process 
o  Build ongoing evaluation procedures throughout the 
procurement process 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Mandate separate evaluations, to be conducted regularly 
and without advance notice, if possible, regardless of 
whether the ongoing evaluation is effective or not 
Table 4.   Summary of Key Internal Control Improvement for Case Study 2. 
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Case Study 3 (Bribery and Fraud Lands Program Manager in Jail) & Case Study 4 
(Misconduct of a First Lieutenant) 
Internal Control 
Component 
Recommended internal controls at various procurement 
processes 
Control Activities • Throughout procurement process 
o Implement segregation of duties in conjunction with 
mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees holding 
corruption prone positions 
o Mandate compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, on a regular basis (preferably on an 
annual basis) 
• Source Selection phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for 
evaluating the price or quotation from the contractor and 
sub-contractors 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for 
acceptance of goods and services 
Monitoring 
Activities 
• Throughout procurement process 
o  Build ongoing evaluation procedures throughout the 
procurement process 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Mandate separate evaluations, to be conducted regularly 
and without advance notice, if possible, regardless of 
whether the ongoing evaluation is effective or not 
Table 5.   Summary of Key Internal Control Improvement for Case Studies 3 and 4. 
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Case Studies 5 to 15 
Internal Control 
Component 




• Throughout procurement process 
o Maintain an ethical environment and a culture of 
honesty within the organization 
o Enhance enforced accountability 
Control Activities • Throughout procurement process 
o Mandate job rotation or vacations for employees 
holding corruption prone positions 
o Mandate compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions, 
including top-level management, on a regular basis 
(preferably on an annual basis) 
o Establish or enhance existing whistle-blower system 
Monitoring 
Activities 
• Throughout procurement process 
o  Build ongoing evaluation procedures throughout the 
procurement process 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Mandate separate evaluations, to be conducted 
regularly and without advance notice, if possible, 
regardless of whether the ongoing evaluation is 
effective or not. 
Table 6.   Summary of Key Internal Control Improvement for Case Studies 5 to 15. 
 




Recommended internal controls at various procurement 
processes 
Control Activities • Solicitation Planning phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” to 
provide adequate review of the evaluation criteria   
• Source Selection phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” to 
provide adequate technical checks of the evaluation 
process and oversight of the contractor 
Table 7.   Summary of Key Internal Control Improvement for Case Study 16. 
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Case Study 17 (Awarding Contracts to Spouse Earns Couple One Year in Prison) 
Internal Control 
Component 
Recommended internal controls at various procurement 
processes 
Control Activities • Throughout procurement process 
o Implement segregation of duties in conjunction with 
mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees holding 
corruption prone positions 
o Mandate compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, on a regular basis (preferably on an 
annual basis) 
• Procurement Planning phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for reviewing 
specification or statement of work before release of 
solicitation 
• Source Selection phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for 
evaluating the price or quotation from the contractor and 
sub-contractors 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for 
acceptance of goods and services 
Monitoring 
Activities 
• Throughout procurement process 
o  Build ongoing evaluation procedures throughout the 
procurement process 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Mandate separate evaluations, to be conducted regularly 
and without advance notice, if possible, regardless of 
whether the ongoing evaluation is effective or not 
Table 8.   Summary of Key Internal Control Improvement for Case Study 17. 
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• Throughout procurement process 
o Maintain an ethical environment and a culture of honesty 
within the organization  
o Reward integrity 
Control 
Activities 
• Throughout procurement process 
o Implement segregation of duties in conjunction with 
mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees holding 
corruption prone positions 
o Mandate compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, on a regular basis (preferably on an 
annual basis) 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for 
acceptance of goods and services 
Monitoring 
Activities 
• Throughout procurement process 
o  Build ongoing evaluation procedures throughout the 
procurement process 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Mandate separate evaluations, to be conducted regularly 
and without advance notice, if possible, regardless of 
whether the ongoing evaluation is effective or not 
Table 9.   Summary of Key Internal Control Improvement for Case Study 18. 
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Case Study 19 (Friends in Low Places) 
Internal Control 
Component 




• Throughout procurement process 
o Maintain an ethical environment and a culture of honesty 
within the organization 
o Establish or enhance existing training policies on anti-
fraud and ethical behavior 
Control Activities o Throughout procurement process 
o  Mandate compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, on a regular basis (preferably on 
an annual basis) 
• Procurement Planning phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for 
specification or statement of work before release for 
solicitation 
• Solicitation Planning phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” to provide 
adequate review of the evaluation criteria  
• Source Selection phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” to provide 
adequate checks of the evaluation process 
Monitoring 
Activities 
• Throughout procurement process 
o  Build ongoing evaluation procedures throughout the 
procurement process 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Mandate separate evaluations, to be conducted regularly 
and without advance notice, if possible, regardless of 
whether the ongoing evaluation is effective or not. 
Table 10.   Summary of Key Internal Control Improvement for Case Study 19. 
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• Throughout procurement process 
o  Maintain an ethical environment and a culture of 
honesty within the organization 
Control 
Activities 
o Throughout procurement process 
o Mandate job rotation or vacations for employees holding 
corruption prone positions 
o Mandate compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions, including 
top-level management, on a regular basis (preferably on 
an annual basis) 
• Procurement Planning phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for 
reviewing specification or statement of work before 
release of solicitation 
• Solicitation Planning phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” to 
provide adequate review of the evaluation criteria  
• Source Selection phase 
o  Implement a system of “checks and balances” for 
evaluation of bid proposals 
Monitoring 
Activities 
• Throughout procurement process 
o  Build ongoing evaluation procedures throughout the 
procurement process 
• Contract Administration phase 
o  Mandate separate evaluations, to be conducted regularly 
and surprise audit, if possible, regardless of whether the 
ongoing evaluation is effective or not. 
Table 11.   Summary of Key Internal Control Improvement for Case Study 20. 
10. Other General Improvements  
In addition to the specific internal control improvements recommended for each 
case study, the following common internal controls are recommended for all the case 
studies for more effective controls: 
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a. Control Environment 
Set a high ethical tone at the top.  Top management must show their 
commitment to combat fraudulent acts.  Talking about its commitment to combat 
fraudulent acts is not adequate; top management has to lead by example. 
Establish a positive environment.  Create a positive work environment 
to promote morale and loyalty of employees.  Employees who are loyal to the 
organization are less likely to defraud the organization since the fraudulent act will hurt 
the organization. 
Reward integrity.  While sufficient punishment for procurement fraud is 
essential to an effective control environment, rewards to staff for ethical behavior is also 
a critical element to fraud prevention.  To encourage ethical behavior, the organization 
should not reward procurement staff only for meeting procurement performance goals, 
but staff should also be rewarded for acting with integrity and ethically. 
b. Risk Assessment 
Implement proactive risk management techniques.  Proactive risk 
management techniques such as surprise audits or analysis of procurement trends to see 
whether the same contractor is winning a contract led by a specific purchasing agent 
should be implemented in the contract administration phase.  If employees know that an 
audit may be conducted at any time, procurement fraud may be less likely to happen. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the recommended improvements for all of the 20 case 
studies of fraud incidents by applying relevant internal controls into the procurement 
process to deter procurement fraud.  While the suggested improvements for each case 
study are recommended to address specific weaknesses identified in each case study, they 
share several similarities.  Such improvements include maintaining an ethical 
environment in the organization, implementing segregation of duties in conjunction with 
mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees holding corruption prone positions, 
mandating compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for employees holding corruption 
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prone positions, establishing effective evaluations in the procurement process and so on.  
A majority of these improvements are also recommended to be applied throughout the 
procurement process, with some improvements recommended for a specific phase of the 
procurement process.  For example, for case studies 1, 17, 19 and 20, it is recommended 
that a system of “checks and balances” for reviewing specifications or statements of work 
before release be implemented in the procurement planning phase.  Finally, some 
common internal controls, such as setting a high ethical tone at the top, establishing a 
positive work environment, rewarding integrity and engaging in proactive risk 
management techniques, are also recommended for all the case studies for more effective 
controls.  The next chapter summarizes and concludes the research and identifies areas 
for further research.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
With the rise in globalization, the use of technology to accelerate approval and 
payable cycles in the outsourcing of goods and services and the huge financial flow it 
generates, government organizations have increasingly become more exposed to the risk 
of fraud in their procurement process.  In this research, an analysis and discussion of how 
internal controls can be integrated into the procurement processes to deter procurement 
fraud was presented.  To build the foundation of knowledge of this research, Chapter II 
presented the literature review concerning the six phases of public procurement process, 
Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway Commission (COSO)’s five 
internal control components, the different types of procurement fraud, and the application 
of internal control components in the procurement process. 
Chapter III provided a review and analysis of 20 case studies of actual fraud 
incidents and discussed the weakness of internal controls that led to the fraudulent 
activities in each case.  In each case study, its internal control weaknesses were identified 
and analyzed in terms of the fundamental principles that are associated with the five 
internal control components.  The analysis revealed that the organizations in the case 
studies mostly lacked three internal control components, namely control environment, 
control activities, and monitoring activities.  Chapter IV provided the recommended 
improvements for each case study by applying relevant internal controls into the 
procurement process to deter procurement fraud. 
B. CONCLUSION 
1. Research Questions 
The purpose of this research was to develop a guideline to help government 
organizations design an effective system of internal controls to deter fraud in public  
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procurement processes and practices.  The following three research questions were 
addressed through the literature review and analysis of actual case studies of fraud 
incidents: 
a. How are Internal Controls and Procurement Processes 
Integrated? 
Proper integration and execution of the five internal control components in 
the procurement process is essential to deter procurement fraud.  The existence of the 17 
fundamental principles associated with the five internal control components in the 
internal control system will suggest whether the internal control system is functioning 
effectively.  Drawing from the literature review concerning the application of internal 
control components in the procurement process in Chapter II, Table 12 summarizes and 
presents the integration of the respective principle of the 17 fundamental principles in the 
procurement process (COSO, 2013): 
 
Internal Control How can Internal Control be integrated in the 
Procurement Process? 
(1) Control Environment 
Principle 1: Demonstrates 
commitment to integrity and ethical 
values 
• Top management must set an ethical tone 
throughout the procurement process and lead by 
example 
Principle 2: Exercises oversight 
responsibility 
• Auditors must have the independent authority to 
conduct contract audits and investigations  
Principle 3: Establishes structure, 
authority and responsibility 
• Organizations must establish a procurement 
organization structure (i.e., centralized, 
decentralized or hybrid model) and include areas 
of authority and line of reporting and 
responsibility to control the flow of procurement 
activities 
Principle 4: Demonstrates 
commitment to competence 
• Organizations must be committed in recruiting, 
developing, and retaining competent and ethical 
procurement staff through: 
(a)  hiring morally sound procurement staff; 
(b) conducting regular training on effective 
procurement techniques and ethical behavior; 
(c) setting challenging but realistic and achievable 
performance goals; and 
(d)  rewarding outstanding performance and 
ethical behavior 
Principle 5: Enforces accountability • Organizations must ensure that: 
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(a) procurement staff members are held 
responsible for their internal control 
responsibilities; and 
(b) there is sufficient punishment for fraudulent 
conduct, and that the punishment is applied 
consistently to anyone who commits 
procurement fraud 
(2) Risk Assessment 
Principle 6: Specifies suitable 
objectives 
• Organizations must 
(a)  specify clear and achievable objectives by 
establishing effective mission statement that 
consists of purpose statement and value 
statement; and 
(b)  set clear and achievable objectives to guide 
and motivate the employees in performing 
their procurement work 
Principles 7 & 8: Identifies and 
analyzes risks 
• Organizations must identify and analyze risks 
(such as bid tailoring) in the procurement process 
that may upset the achievement of its objectives. 
Principle 9: Identifies and analyzes 
significant change 
• Organizations must identify and assess how the 
identified risks should be managed. For example, 
the best approach to manage risk (such as bid 
tailoring) that has a significant impact on the 
organization but lower probability of occurring is 
to mitigate it by developing specific internal 
controls to address it. 
(3) Control Activities  
Principles 10, 11 and 12: Selects and 
develops control activities and 
deploys through policies and 
procedures 
• Organizations must select and implement relevant 
control activities in the procurement process to 
adequately address the identified risk.  For 
example, to address the risk of bid tailoring, some 
specific control activities include segregation of 
duties and mandatory rotation of duties for 
employees holding corruption prone positions. 
(4) Information and Communication 
 
Principles 13, 14 and 15: Uses 
relevant information and 
communicates internally and 
externally 
 
• Organizations must communicate relevant 
information (such as organization’s objectives, 
control activities such as whistle-blower hotline) 
to procurement staff and contractors 
(5) Monitoring Activities 
Principles 16 and 17: Conducts 
ongoing and/or separate evaluations 
and evaluates and communicates 
deficiencies 
• Organizations must ensure that evaluations are 
built into the procurement process to assess if the 
other four internal controls are functioning 
effectively to deter procurement fraud and, if not, 
to report to management and correct inefficiency 
immediately. 
Table 12.   Integration of Internal Control and Procurement Process. 
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b. What Factors Contribute to Public Procurement Fraud 
Incidents? 
The analysis of the 20 case studies in Chapter III suggested that the main 
factors that contributed to the procurement fraud incidents were the lack of enforcement 
in three internal control components, namely the control environment, control activities, 
and monitoring activities.  In terms of the control environment, the organizations in the 
case studies were vulnerable to fraud because these organizations lacked a high ethical 
tone at the top, and they failed to demonstrate a commitment to develop and maintain a 
competent, professional and ethical procurement workforce.  In terms of control 
activities, the organizations failed to (a) mandate regular anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions; (b) mandate segregation of duties and 
compulsory job rotation or vacation for employees holding corruption prone positions; 
(c) set up a “checks and balances" system in key procurement processes and so on.  In 
terms of monitoring activities, the organizations lacked effective ongoing and separate 
evaluations procedures. 
c. How Can Internal Controls within the Procurement Processes 
Deter Public Procurement Fraud? 
The analysis and the recommendations chapters suggested that 
procurement fraud can be deterred by applying relevant internal controls into the 
procurement processes.  The main recommendation for improvements include: (a) 
maintaining an ethical tone at the top and a culture of honesty throughout the 
procurement process; (b) implementing segregation of duties in conjunction with 
mandatory job rotation or vacations for employees holding corruption prone positions 
throughout the procurement process; (c) compulsory anti-fraud and ethics training for 
employees holding corruption prone positions on a regular basis (preferably on an annual 
basis); (d) establishing effective evaluations into the procurement process and (e) 
implementing a system of “checks and balances” in procurement planning, solicitation 
planning, source selection and contract administration phases.  In the next section, areas 
for further research will be presented. 
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2. Areas for Further Research 
The following areas for further research are suggested: 
One area for further research is to conduct an analysis of internal control 
limitations and the impact on the organization’s effort in meeting objectives.  There is no 
such thing as a perfect internal control system.  No matter how well an internal control 
system is designed and implemented, it does not guarantee that the organization’s 
objectives will be met.  Factors such as human error and poor judgment can limit the 
effectiveness of any well designed internal control system.  Understanding the internal 
control limitations and the potential impact will assist and direct government 
organizations in their effort to develop and design an effective and realistic internal 
controls system to deter fraud in the public procurement processes and practices. 
Another area for further research is to conduct a study to assess the effectiveness 
of Australia, United Kingdom (UK), and U.S. governments’ procurement fraud 
prevention strategies by comparing them with the COSO’s model of an internal control 
so as to identify areas of strengths and weaknesses and any relevant improvements that 
need to be implemented. 
These two possible research areas will aid other governments in their effort for 
the development of practical and effective internal control systems so as to further help 
reduce fraud in the public procurement processes and practices. 
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APPENDIX A. CODE OF ETHICS FOR GOVERNMENT 
SERVICE 
Any person in Government service should: 
1.  Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to 
Government persons, party, or department. 
2.  Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United States 
and of all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion. 
3.  Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay; giving to the performance of his 
duties his earnest effort and best thought. 
4.  Seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting 
tasks accomplished. 
5.  Never discriminate unfairly by the dispensing of special favors or 
privileges to anyone, whether for remuneration or not; and never accept 
for himself or his family, favors or benefits under circumstances which 
might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the performance 
of his governmental duties. 
6.  Make no private promises of any kind binding upon the duties of office, 
since a Government employee has no private word which can be binding 
on public duty. 
7.  Engage in no business with the Government, either directly or indirectly, 
which is inconsistent with the conscientious performance of his 
governmental duties. 
8.  Never use any information coming to him confidentially in the 
performance of governmental duties as a means for making private profit. 
9.  Expose corruption wherever discovered. 
10. Uphold these principles, ever conscious that public office is a public trust. 
 
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, 2008 
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APPENDIX B. NCMA’S CODE OF ETHICS 
Each member of the profession shall: 
1. Strive to attain the highest professional standard of job performance, to 
exercise diligence in carrying out one's professional duties, and to serve 
the profession to the best of one’s ability. 
2. Conduct oneself in such a manner as to bring credit upon the profession, 
as well as to maintain trust and confidence in the integrity of the contract 
management process. 
3. Avoid engagement in any transaction that might conflict or appear to 
conflict with the proper discharge of one's professional duties by reason of 
a financial interest, family relationship, or any other circumstances. 
4. Comply with all laws and regulations that govern the contract 
management process in the jurisdictions in which one conducts business, 
including protection of competition-sensitive and proprietary information 
from inappropriate disclosure. 
5. Keep informed of developments in the contract management field, 
utilizing both formal training and ad hoc means, to continuously increase 
knowledge, skill, and professional competence. 
6. Share one’s knowledge and experience openly to contribute to the 
development of other professionals, improve performance quality, and 
enhance public perception of the profession.  
7. Not knowingly influence others to commit any act that would constitute a 
violation of this code.  
 
Source: NCMA, 2012 
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APPENDIX C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FOR 
CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS 
• A Certified Fraud Examiner shall, at all times, demonstrate a commitment 
to professionalism and diligence in the performance of his or her duties. 
• A Certified Fraud Examiner shall not engage in any illegal or unethical 
conduct, or any activity which would constitute a conflict of interest. 
• A Certified Fraud Examiner shall, at all times, exhibit the highest level of 
integrity in the performance of all professional assignments and will 
accept only assignments for which there is reasonable expectation that the 
assignment will be completed with professional competence. 
• A Certified Fraud Examiner will comply with lawful orders of the courts 
and will testify to matters truthfully and without bias or prejudice. 
• A Certified Fraud Examiner, in conducting examinations, will obtain 
evidence or other documentation to establish a reasonable basis for any 
opinion rendered. No opinion shall be expressed regarding the guilt or 
innocence of any person or party. 
• A Certified Fraud Examiner shall not reveal any confidential information 
obtained during a professional engagement without proper authorization. 
• A Certified Fraud Examiner will reveal all material matters discovered 
during the course of an examination which, if omitted, could cause a 
distortion of the facts. 
• A Certified Fraud Examiner shall continually strive to increase the 
competence and effectiveness of professional services performed under his 
or her direction.  
 
Source: ACFE-online, 2013 
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APPENDIX D. PROCUREMENT FRAUD CASES 
Case Study 1 (Navy Bribery Scheme) 
The bribery scheme involved a program for the maintenance of military airplanes 
at a U.S. Navy readiness center.  The U.S. Navy had contracts with L&N Industrial Tool 
& Supply, Centerline Industrial, Inc. and X&D for supplying tooling and tooling-related 
products to repair the military airplanes.  A former civilian employee of the U.S. Navy 
was the tool control manager at the center.  His responsibilities, amongst other things, 
included writing statements of work and contracts, supervision and authorizing purchase 
and replacement of tools for the maintenance of the planes as well as administering the 
contracts.  This employee and four co-workers working at the center first intentionally 
wrote those “to be exploited” contracts vaguely to avoid some normal procurement 
procedures.  They also excluded the requirements for yearly audits and a contracting 
officer’s representative to monitor the contractor’s performance which was normally 
required.  After the contracts were established, the U.S. Navy former civilian employee 
began to ask the contractors to pay for personal items for him and the co-workers.  After 
paying for the bribe items, the contractors would then convert these payments into 
invoices for services allowed under the contract but which were not required and not 
performed.  The bribery started small with gift cards to Lowe’s, Best Buy or the Apple 
store, a bottle of liquor and later, it evolved into more expensive bribe items such as 
massage chairs, computers for the office, remote-controlled airplanes, 42-inch flat screen 
TV.  The fraud scheme also involved asking contractors to provide goods and services for 
the center that were beyond the scope of contract.  The contractors would then bill the 
government organization under the pretext of kitting or reamer services that were 
allowable under the contract.  The five conspirators benefited in the range of $50,000 to 
$400,000 in the form of cash, gift cards, labor and so on.  The contractors, on the other 
hand, received about $4.5 million of government work.  The fraud scheme went 
unnoticed for almost a decade and would have continued if not for an anonymous tip to a 
government anti-fraud hotline.  No one noticed the fraudulent activity because the 




Case Study 2 (U.S Army Corps of Engineers Fraud) 
A former program manager for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, together with 
other corrupt public officials and his family members, colluded with six contractors to 
steal over $30 million from the government through inflated and falsified invoices.  The 
fraudulent activities occurred from 2007 to 2011.  The former U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers employee, being a program manager and contracting officer’s technical 
representative, was given the authority, amongst other things, to issue orders for goods 
and services against government term contracts as well as the authority to certify the 
completion of goods and services.  Through bid tailoring and bid-rigging schemes, the 
former U.S. Army Corps of Engineers employee steered contracts to conspiring 
contractors (directly and indirectly), in exchange for kickbacks or bribes.  In this case, the 
former U.S. Army Corps of Engineers employee and other corrupt public officials 
obtained contracts for conspiring contractor A, and contractor A would in turn sub-
contract work to other conspiring contractors.  These conspiring contractors and sub-
contractors often provided goods and services in accordance with the contract but would 
submit inflated and falsified quotations for goods and services.  A portion of the payment 
received would be given to the former U.S. Army Corps of Engineers employee and other 
corrupt public officials as bribes or kickbacks (Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
2013). 
Case Study 3 (Bribery and Fraud Lands Program Manager in Jail) 
A program manager (PM), who was responsible for administering computer 
contracts to the U.S. federal government, colluded with a contractor and set up a shell 
company to defraud the government.  The PM inflated the price of computer storage 
equipment by $500 per unit.  The inflated price was due to the “additional services” for 
the maintenance of the equipment that were allowed under the contract but were not 
required and not performed.  The $500 for the performance of the “additional services” 
was then paid to the shell company owned by the PM’s wife.  In addition, the PM used 
the shell company to purchase generic equipment and re-sell it to the government as a 
branded product above the market price.  As a result, the PM had stolen about $3.2M 
from the government (Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
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Case Study 4 (Misconduct of a First Lieutenant) 
A retired First Lieutenant, who was responsible for administering contracts at 
Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, colluded with contractors to defraud the government.  The 
retired First Lieutenant falsified the number of bunkers and barriers delivered at Bagram, 
which resulted in DoD paying for additional bunkers and barriers that were not required 
and received. As a result, the retired First Lieutenant had stolen about $120,000 from the 
government (Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Case Study 5 (Major Wrongdoing) 
An U.S. Army Major, a contracting officer at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, accepted 
bribes from five DoD contractors that supplied bottled water and other goods and 
services to the bases in Kuwait.  The U.S. Army Major abused his authority as a 
contracting officer, awarded contracts and Blanket Purchase Agreement to the five 
contractors, and in return, he received approximately $5.8 million of cash bribes 
(Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Case Study 6 (Former Federal Highway Administration Official and Wife Engage in 
Corrupt Scheme) 
A former federal Highway administration official colluded with a contractor to 
defraud the government.  He engineered the award of contracts involving traffic 
engineering services to a contractor, and in return, the contractor granted a sub-contract 
to the employee’s wife’s “consulting firm.”  The “consulting firm” had no traffic 
engineering experience (Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Case Study 7 (Air Force Contracting Officer Pays $6,000 for 18 U.S.C. 209 
Violation) 
An Air Force contracting officer colluded with a contractor to defraud the 
government by providing favourable treatment to the contractor. In return, the contracting 
officer received bribes in the form of condominium rental payments and other valuable 
goods and items for the condominium (Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 
2013). 
Case Study 8 (Contractors and Federal Personnel, Working Together, Defraud the 
Government and Go to Jail) 
A former lieutenant colonel with the United States Army Reserves together with 
numerous public officials (including two high-ranking U.S. Army officers) colluded with 
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a U.S. contractor to defraud the Coalition Provisional Authority - South Central Region 
(CPA-SC) involving contracts in the reconstruction of Iraq.  These public officials 
collaborated to rig the bids on contracts awarded by CPA-SC such that all the contracts 
were awarded to the U.S contractor.  In return, these public officials received bribery 
money of over $1 million in terms of cash, sports cars, computers, jewellery, liquor and 
future employment with this U.S contractor (Department of Justice 07-449, 2007). 
Case Study 9 (One Happy Family Spends Time Together in Jail) 
A program director for the General Services Administration colluded with the two 
contractors to defraud the U.S. federal government by steering contracts to these 
contractors.  In exchange, these contractors granted sub-contracts to his personal business 
and his daughters. These sub-contracts received over $800,000 in payment but did not 
perform any services for the government (Department of Defense General Counsel’s 
Office, 2013). 
Case Study 10 (Conflict of Interest Results in Jail Time for Acquisitions Executive) 
A former senior Air Force official while participating personally as a chief 
negotiator in the negotiation for a $23 billion leasing of tanker aircraft contract with 
Boeing (on a sole-source contract basis), was simultaneously negotiating with Boeing for 
a possible job offer.  The former senior Air Force official kept secret her negotiation with 
Boeing on the job offer.  When the former senior Air Force official finally submitted her 
letter in which she disqualified herself from working on matters involving Boeing, she 
collaborated with Boeing’s senior executive to lie regarding the timing of her 
employment discussions and negotiation.  The former senior Air Force official also 
abused her position in the U.S. federal government to get her daughter and son-in-law 
jobs at Boeing (Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Case Study 11 (Awarding Contracts to Spouse II) 
A contracting officer for the General Services Administration defrauded the 
organization by directing contracts to her husband’s employer.  A total of about $11.5 
million worth of contracts for purchase of food preparation and servicing equipment 
items was awarded to the company.  In exchange, the contracting officer’s husband was 
rewarded with higher salary and a Jaguar from his employer (Department of Defense 
General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
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Case Study 12 (Army Employee Sentenced for Conflicts of Interest) 
An employee of the U.S. Army was involved in the awarding and administration 
of contracts that involves a company that the employee owned stock. The employee 
failed to disclose his financial interest in the company (Department of Defense General 
Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Case Study 13 (Contractors and Army Officer Face Five Years for Conflict of 
Interest) 
An Army colonel while performing his official duties of supervising solicitation, 
award and oversight of more than 17,000 contracts in Korea was negotiating with two 
contractors for a possible job offer.  In addition, the Army colonel had overruled the 
decision of technical experts to award a contract to a different company, and instead 
recommended the award of the contracts to his potential employer.  In return, the Army 
colonel received bribes from the companies and job offers from the companies.  The 
Army colonel had in total pocketed over $700,000 of bribes.  These bribes had resulted in 
almost $25 million worth of contracts awarded to conspiring contractors for building 
facilities and security guard services in Korea (Department of Defense General Counsel’s 
Office, 2013). 
Case Study 14 (Post Employment “Lifetime Ban”) 
A government employee was involved in the approval and award of a supply 
contract for audio/visual equipment to his future employer.  This resulted in the 
government having to pay about $6 million for equipment that was only worth $841,000 
(Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Case Study 15 (Family Business Venture Ends in Violation of 18 U.S.C. 209) 
A contracting officer at the Naval Surface Warfare Center together with his 
father-in-law defrauded the government.  The contracting officer directed government 
contracts for the purchase of computer equipment to a company that was co-owned by 
him and his father-in-law.  They would purchase computer equipment from a vendor and 
charged the government an inflated price for the equipment. As a result, the government 
paid $29,000 for computer equipment that was only worth $11,000 (Department of 
Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
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Case Study 16 (Special Operations Command Bribery Scandal Nabs Two Retired 
Officers) 
Two retired military officers of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) colluded 
with contractors to defraud the U.S. federal government by engineering the award of 
weapons contracts to conspiring contractors. In return, the retired military officials 
received kickbacks from these contractors.  The first official, a retired Army lieutenant 
colonel, was engaged by SOCOM as a contractor to evaluate the proposals for the supply 
of weapons for the special operations forces.  The second official, a retired Army colonel 
who was formerly the chief of special programs at SOCOM, set up a consulting firm to 
provide consultation services to companies to successfully secure SOCOM’s contracts.  
The first official gave favorable reviews of the conspiring contractors’ proposals for 
weapons so that the conspiring companies could win SOCOM contracts.  In return, the 
consulting firm would pay kickbacks to the first official.  To pay for the kickbacks, the 
conspiring companies would inflate the prices of goods and services artificially 
(Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Case Study 17 (Awarding Contracts to Spouse Earns Couple One Year in Prison) 
An employee development specialist of the Department of the Treasury (DOT) 
defrauded the organization by directing contracts to the companies owned by her husband 
over the course of a two-year period.  The employee was responsible for determining 
training needs and procuring training services for DOT employees.  Over the two-year 
period, the employee had awarded 105 training contracts amounting to $139,600 to her 
husband’s companies (Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Case Study 18 (Marine Corps Say Goodbye to Officers Who Schemed with Thai 
Vendors) 
Three officers of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Joint U.S. Military Group, 
Thailand, colluded with a Thai contractor to defraud the U.S. federal government.  The 
first two officials passed inside information to the Thai contractor so that it could increase 
its bid and profit margin while still ensuring that it submitted the lowest bid.  In 
exchange, the two officers received bribes and kickbacks of more than $100,000 in the 
form of gifts such as a truck, free hotel rooms and a loan for a house.  The third officer 
abused his authority as the receipt officer, signed delivery notes from the conspiring Thai 
contractor even though the contractor had only delivered incomplete shipments. The Thai 
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contractor then billed the government for the complete shipments. In exchange, the third 
official received bribes for the ghost shipments (Department of Defense General 
Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
Case Study 19 (Friends in Low Places) 
Two former U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) officers colluded to defraud DOI 
through a bid tailoring scheme.  The first officer, a former deputy associate director of 
DOI, accepted a job offer from a contractor six months before he retired from DOI.  His 
future employer was a sub-contractor to a DoD contractor owned by another former DOI 
employee (known as the second officer).  During this six-month period, the first officer 
established the evaluation criteria for the bid for this same contract and sat in the 
evaluation committee that recommended the award of the contract to the DoD contractor 
owned by the second officer.  The second officer, a former DOI employee, was a friend 
of the first officer.  Prior to the second officer’s retirement from DOI, the second officer 
created the technical specifications of the requirement for the same contract with the 
intent to bid on the contract immediately after his retirement.  Together with the first 
officer who was responsible for creating the evaluation criteria and evaluating the 
proposal, the second officer was successfully awarded the contract with a grade of 
“excellent” on every evaluation criteria (Department of Defense General Counsel’s 
Office, 2013). 
Case Study 20 (Patrick Air Force Base Engineer Violates Conflict of Interest 
Statute) 
An Air Force base engineer in the contracts department at Patrick Air Force Base 
colluded with a contractor to defraud the government.  A company, formed by the 
engineer and numerous government employees, submitted a bid to the base. The 
engineer, who was responsible for the technical evaluation of the bids, gave a favorable 
review of the bid submitted by his company, and the company was awarded the contract 
(Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office, 2013). 
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Process is Vulnerable to 
Fraud? 
Which Internal Control 




1 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1, 3 and 4) 
• Risk Assessment 
(Principles 7 to 9) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 




2 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principle 1) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 
• Bid Tailoring 
• Bid Rigging 
(sub-contracting 
scheme) 
3 • Source Selection 
• Contract Administration 
 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 





• Shell Company 
Scheme 
4 • Contract Administration 
 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 





5 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 




6 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 




7 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 






8 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 
• Bid Tailoring 
• Bid 
Manipulation 
9 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 




• Bid Tailoring 
10 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 





• Unjustified Sole 
Source Awards 
Scheme 
11 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 




12 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 




13 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 




14 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 






15 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principles 1 and 5) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 




16 • Solicitation planning 
• Source Selection 
• Control Activities 




17 • Procurement Planning 
• Source Selection 
• Contract Administration 
 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 
• Conflict of 
interest 
• Bid Tailoring 
• Bid 
Manipulation 
18 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principle 1) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 




19 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principle 4) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 
• Conflict of 
interest 




20 • All procurement process • Control Environment 
(Principle 1) 
• Control Activities 
(Principles 10 and 12) 
• Monitoring Activities 
(Principle 16) 
• Conflict of 
interest 
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